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AB STRACT. Spurred on by the recent Second Circuit decision in United States v. Newman,
this Feature examines the proper scope of the prohibition against insider trading under the
securities laws. It argues that in some instances the law does not reach far enough, while in other
instances the law reaches too far. On the first point, it is a mistake to require the government to
show that a tippee who receives inside information supplies any kind of benefit to the insider
before the tippee is subject to criminal prosecution. The simple status of the tippee as donee or
bad-faith purchaser of improperly released information should suffice.
On the second point, the prohibition against fraud and manipulation contained in Rule iob-
5 should cover only those activities actionable under common-law theories dealing with
misrepresentation, nondisclosure, and breach of fiduciary duty. In no way does the language or
structure of the provision mandate a level playing field in which all players are entitled to have
equal access to all nonpublic information. Accordingly, it is highly doubtful that Rule sob-5
should apply to so-called misappropriation cases in which individuals improperly use
confidential information for their own purposes, as in United States v. O'Hagan. Nor is it wise to
create civil liability under Regulation Fair Disclosure (Regulation FD), which may well retard
the production of useful information by requiring that it be shared simultaneously with all
players. In both Regulation FD and misappropriation cases, private sanctions that regulate the
uneven flow of information should suffice to control any abuses, and these sanctions should
include the imposition of constructive trust, based on a restitution theory of unjust enrichment,
against all tippees who know that they have received misappropriated information. It is much
more difficult to decide whether to invoke criminal prosecutions for misappropriation of firm
information against analysts who receive, directly or indirectly, information from insiders who
disclose that information consistent with company policies intended to lift overall share levels.
There is no reason for that question to be decided in a misappropriation context differently from
how it is decided in other contexts, most notably that of trade secrets, where the legal response is
itself divided.
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INTRODUCTION
On December 1o, 2014, the Second Circuit handed Preet Bharara, the
hugely ambitious United States Attorney for the Southern District of New
York, one of his rare defeats in securities fraud litigation. In United States v.
Newman,' the Second Circuit unanimously reversed, with prejudice, the insider
trading convictions for securities fraud and conspiracy to commit securities
fraud of two analysts, Todd Newman and Anthony Chiasson. The actions were
brought pursuant to Section io(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule lob-5, which
are set out in the margin.' In the words of Judge Parker: "The Government
alleged that a cohort of analysts at various hedge funds and investment firms
obtained material, nonpublic information from employees of publicly traded
technology companies, shared it amongst each other, and subsequently passed
this information to the portfolio managers at their respective companies."'
According to the indictment, these analysts then passed this information on to
Newman and Chiasson, who "willfully" participated in the scheme by trading
1. 773 F. 3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 242 (2015).
2. Section io(b) of the Exchange Act (as amended) provides (in pertinent part):
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange ...
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered,
or any securities-based swap agreement [as defined in section 2o6B of
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act], any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest
or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
Rule iob-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 24o.1ob-5 (2015).
3. Newman, 773 F.3 d at 442.
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on this information in the course of their own business." The taint arose
because this behavior was inconsistent with Regulation Fair Disclosure
(Regulation FD), which requires that the information must be disclosed
simultaneously to all outsiders if it is disclosed to any.s
The unexpected outcome in this case has fueled an effort to reexamine the
fundamental principles governing insider trading, which are still in flux even
today. In order to reexamine these principles, this Feature proceeds as follows.
Part I gives an account of the various factual and legal issues that were
arrayed in Newman to set the stage for a more comprehensive reexamination of
the fundamental principles of insider trading.
Part II examines-in light of Newman-the two major forms of insider
trading liability, the so-called classical theory and the more modern
misappropriation theory, first as they apply to insiders and then as they apply
to tippees (those persons who traded on the tipped information). Part II argues
two points. First, it argues that contractual solutions work better than
regulatory solutions to constrain various forms of misrepresentation,
concealment, and nondisclosure that arise in connection with insider trading.
Second, it argues that the standard doctrines of the constructive trust do better
than the so-called personal-benefit test of Dirks in identifying which tippees
should be subject to liability for receiving information; this is the case where a
constructive trust theory undoes the unjust enrichment that takes place if
tippees are allowed to use that information for their own benefit.
Part III extends the analysis of the misappropriation theory of securities
violation to critique Regulation FD. Regulation FD places an unfortunate
straitjacket on how various firms do business with analysts of their stock. The
insiders owe no fiduciary duties to analysts. But they do owe such duties to
their shareholders, and the firms' officers and directors should be allowed to
authorize their employees to make selective disclosures of inside information so
long as these officers and directors have concluded in good faith that the
release of that information will increase overall firm value.
Part IV applies the conclusions reached in the earlier three parts to examine
more closely the role that the personal-benefit test and information flows have
in dealing with insider trading. On the former, the Second Circuit incorrectly
stiffened the government's burden on the personal-benefit test relative to what
4- Id.
5. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716 (Aug. 24, 2000) (codified
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243 & 249). The rule changes the law under Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646
(1983), which had previously been thought to insulate selective disclosures to analysts from
insider trading liability, by creating civil liability for selective disclosures. See Paul P.
Brountas Jr., Note, Rule lob-5 and Voluntary Corporate Disclosures to Securities Analysts, 92
COLUM. L. REV. 1517, 1529 (1992).
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it was in Dirks. On the latter, the government's inability to trace the flow of
information from the insiders to the defendant tippees moots the former
error - at least on the evidence accepted in the Second Circuit - and justifies the
outcome, but not the reasoning, in Newman.
Part V then applies this general analysis to other recent cases, both before
and after Newman, to further examine the contours of the misappropriation
theory. In general, the cases are correct to downplay the personal-benefit prong
of the test. These cases also illustrate the vast gulf that exists between the
disclosure of information in the ordinary course of business, for which no
liability should be imposed either on the insider or any tippees, and the
clandestine release of information, which in virtually all cases should result in
criminal liability.
A short conclusion then urges a return of the law of securities fraud to its
traditional contours, which should limit criminal prosecutions to insiders and
their tippees who make deliberate use of information that they know was
limited to use for firm purposes. The most appropriate goal of insider trading
laws is not to advance some ad hoc theory of fairness, which typically shrinks
the size of the pie without offering any coherent account of how that reduced
stock of wealth should be divided. Instead, insider trading laws should work to
increase capital market efficiency, which often requires the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) to shrink its oversight role.
1. NEWMAN AND CHIASSON IN THE DOCK
In May 2013, Todd Newman and Anthony Chiasson were both sentenced
for securities fraud and conspiracy to commit securities fraud after a six-week
trial before Judge Sullivan.6 Newman was a portfolio manager at Diamondback
Capital Management, LLC, and Chiasson was a portfolio manager at Level
Global Investors, L.P.' The two men were charged with trading on inside
information that originated inside two companies, Dell and NVIDIA.8 Neither
man received the information directly from parties inside the companies, but
only through a set of intermediaries.'
With respect to Dell, Newman's inside source of the information was Rob
Ray, an employee in Dell's investor relations department. Ray tipped some
information about anticipated earnings reports to Sandy Goyal, an analyst at
6. Newman, 773 F.3 d at 444.
7. Id. at 442.
8. Id.
9. For the chain of information transmission for both Dell and NVIDIA, see id.
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Neuberger Berman. That information was in turn relayed to Jesse Tortora, an
analyst at Diamondback, who in turn gave that information about Dell first to
Newman and then to Spyridon Adondakis at Level Global, who in turn passed
the information on to Chiasson. Newman was thus three persons removed
from the original source and Chiasson was four persons removed. The identical
information was also given to other analysts from different companies.
The chain of communication with NVIDIA started with Chris Choi, who
worked in NVIDIA's finance unit, who tipped information about NVIDIA's
earnings projections to Hyung Lim, an executive at another technology
company, whom Choi knew from church. Thereafter, Lim shared the
information with Danny Kuo, an employee at Whittier Trust, who in turn
circulated it to a group of analysts including both Tortora and Adondakis, who
in turn gave the information respectively to Newman and Chiasson, so that in
both cases the chain contained three links.
In dealing with these two criminal indictments, the district court held that
the government could make its case by showing that the defendants "knew that
the material, nonpublic information had been disclosed by the insider in breach
of a duty of trust and confidence" owed to his employer.o At no point did the
district court instruct the jury that the corporate insiders who had provided the
inside information to the defendants must have done so in exchange for some
personal benefit to them, which was required for a conviction under the
Supreme Court's decision in Dirks." Defendants were convicted on all counts.
Newman had to pay about $1,738,000 in fines and forfeitures and was
sentenced to fifty-four months in prison followed by one year of supervised
release." Chiasson had to pay up to seven million dollars in fines and
forfeitures and was sentenced to seventy-eight months in prison followed by
one year of supervised release.' 3
Two questions were posed on appeal. The first was whether the evidence
introduced into the record could support the proposition that the insider had
received a personal benefit on the strength of his personal and social ties.' The
second was whether the chain of causation that linked the defendants as
remote tippees of the leaked information was tight enough to support the claim
that the two defendants "knew that they were trading on information obtained
from insiders."" Regarding the personal-benefit issue, the Second Circuit
io. Id. at 444 (citing the district judge's jury instructions).
ni. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
12. Newman, 773 F.3d at 444-45.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 442.
15. Id.
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reached two conclusions. The first was that the personal benefit to the insider
standard required showing more than some social friendship or connection."
The second was that, in light of the weakness of the evidence, the failure of the
District Court to instruct on the personal-benefit question should not be
disregarded as "harmless" error." On the chain-of-causation issue, the court
found that the government presented "absolutely no testimony or any other
evidence" on the critical scienter requirement -that is, whether Newman and
Chiasson knew that they received forbidden information. 8 One conclusion
from that observation is that the original insiders may have been guilty, but the
recipients of the information were not.
In my view, the Second Circuit's decision to dismiss the complaint with
prejudice was correct under current law. However, for purposes of this Feature,
the outcome of the case is less important than the legal framework used to
decide it; there are doctrinal and institutional issues raised by Newman, both
under current law and as a matter of first principle. Under current law, the two
key elements involved in this case should not be considered of equal
importance in the general theory of insider trading. In a first-best world, the
requirement of a "personal benefit" as derived from Dirks should be regarded
as a red herring and removed from securities cases altogether -which is a real
advantage to the government. Similarly, the requirement not to trade on inside
information should not be limited only to individuals who are subject to
fiduciary duties.19 But more importantly, the remainder of Newman deals with
the knowing use of nonpublic and material information, which is hard to
analyze given the complex paths over which that information traveled before
resulting in trades in the two companies' shares. As will become clear, the
defendants in Newman should be acquitted under current law. The sole ground
needed for reaching that conclusion is that the Second Circuit found that there
was no evidence in the record to establish that the defendants knew they were
trading on unauthorized information released in violation of the fiduciary
duties of insiders.
Normatively, it is also appropriate to ask whether Regulation FD should
impose a uniform obligation that requires that all information be released
simultaneously to all persons. If that regulation is dismissed, then the scope of
16. See id. at 452.
17. Id. at 451.
18. Id. at 453.
ig. This would require a reconsideration of Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 224-25
(1980), where the prohibition against insider trading did not extend to the "markup man" at
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securities laws will be necessarily narrowed because the definition of inside
information will be narrowed. This narrowed scope would allow parties
autonomy over any information that is released in accordance with firm policy,
without fear of SEC enforcement.' It follows, therefore, that the Regulation
has no direct effect on enforcement actions by ambitious United States
Attorneys like Preet Bharara, but the Regulation nonetheless reinforces the
belief that an extensive reading of the securities law works in general for the
public interest. In the remainder of this piece, I shall deal in Part II with
matters of first principle and then turn in Part III to the larger question of the
extent to which the government, through the Department of Justice, should
engage in criminal enforcement of the securities fraud law.
11. BACK TO FIRST PRINCIPLES
A. Contract Versus Regulation
As a matter of first principle, I am in general deeply suspicious of any
government-imposed insider trading prohibitions and think that they do little
to improve the overall condition of trading in American securities markets
beyond what private agreements can achieve.' The best way to examine this
question is to start with yet another variation of the "single owner" theorem 2.
Start with one person who owns any particular asset that is divided among
multiple players through a succession of contracts, such that when the dust
settles, the network of contractual arrangements binds each person to everyone
else in that common business venture, regardless of its form. At this point the
notion of "externality" disappears because all of the harms that come to anyone
locked within this system are borne by the original owner when he parts
seriatim with portions of his initial shares in the new company. Hence any
increase that he gets by giving one party an advantage over another redounds
both to his benefit and harm. The benefit comes from the one side, but the
harm comes from having to reduce the amount charged to the other purchasers
or to the interest that he retains. In the relatively easy cases, the parties stand in
20. Violations of Regulation FD are subject only to SEC enforcement, and do not constitute
violations of Rule 1ob-5. See 17 C.F.R. § 243.102 (2015) ("No failure to make a public
disclosure required solely by [Regulation FD] shall be deemed to be a violation of Rule lob-
5 ... under the Securities Exchange Act.").
21. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RuLES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 254-57 (1995). See generally
Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REv.
857 (1983).
22. See Richard A. Epstein, Holdouts, Externalities, and the Single Owner: One More Salute to
Ronald Coase, 36J.L. &ECON. 553, 555 (1993).
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symmetrical relationships to each other so that each gets a fixed fraction of the
pie. On that austere assumption, the original owner will always opt to pick the
solution that maximizes the size of the whole pie in order to maximize the size
of his own slice. This situation can arise with various land-use transactions,
when parcels are sold off subject to a network of reciprocal covenants and
easements that bind all to all, regardless of their respective times of
acquisition.'
The same logic applies to the formation of a corporation, as Dennis Carlton
and Daniel Fischel argued many years ago, if the original charter contains key
governance provisions that govern all subsequent purchasers.' In this context,
the question is whether - and if so, in what form - these parties would opt to
include some prohibition on insider trading, knowing that they will have to
internalize the insider trading rules. It would be a grievous mistake to assume
that they would choose to impose no restrictions whatsoever. More precisely,
they will impose these restrictions whenever they think that the benefits to the
firm's shareholders on net outweigh their costs, for that maneuver will allow
the parties to maximize the revenues that they can get from an original public
offering. It hardly follows, however, that the optimal set of restrictions
generated by this approach would look anything like the current prohibitions
on insider trading, most especially the criminal sanctions that were at issue in
Newman. The point here is not that investment markets can thrive in the
constant presence of fraud and manipulation. The point is quite the opposite.
The risks of fraud and manipulation are so deadly to the market that private
firms have every incentive to seek out the optimal solution to insider trading,
whether by directors, officers, or ordinary employees, wholly apart from any
government sanctions, in order to preserve the value of their shares. It is of
course difficult if not impossible today to demonstrate the truth of this
proposition by empirical evidence, given that every firm now works in the
shadow of the insider trading laws and thus has to address these issues in the
current externally regulated setting. But as will become clear later in this
Feature, the scope of the private prohibitions on insider trading is often quite
extensive, and goes well beyond what the law requires. Reputation in general is
a powerful determinant of firm value, and it can be eroded by regulation that
undermines the operation of traditional informal bonding devices.' That
23. For the development of this theme, see Richard A. Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in
the Law of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REv. 1353 (1982).
24. See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 21, at 857-58.
25. See generally JONATHAN R. MACEY, THE DEATH OF CORPORATE REPUTATION: How
INTEGRITY HAS BEEN DESTROYED ON WALL STREET (2013).
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proposition applies to insider trading as much as it does to any other
government activity.
Evidently, to state the problem in this general form is not to solve it,
because of the complexity of any disclosure regime. One source of the difficulty
is clear enough. Any public disclosure goes not only to shareholders of a
particular firm, but also to competitors of the firm, who can take advantage of
that information in planning their own behavior. Thus, in SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co.,26 a group of insiders purchased shares of the company knowing
that the firm had discovered valuable copper deposits near Timmins, Ontario,
which the firm desired to keep confidential until it completed the acquisition of
nearby lands.' Secrecy benefited the shareholders, because at this point it
would have been foolish to publicly disclose these discoveries, which would
allow competitors to hone in on the same territory and thereby drive up the
acquisition cost of nearby land. Similarly, it would have been equally
improvident for the insiders to dole out that information piecemeal to their
friends and business associates, knowing that any actions that these people
took to acquire nearby properties would necessarily work to the detriment of
the shareholders. 8 In contrast to these two scenarios, allowing the insiders to
trade on that information could have driven up share prices in ways that
reflected the value of that information, without disclosing its source. Insider
trading could thus have led to more accurate pricing that in turn would have
reduced sharp fluctuations in share values when the information did come to
light.'
This bald proposition is, and should be, contentious, and the same answer
might not work for all firms in all cases. But this is the juncture where the
contractual approach shows its strength. By announcing in advance that
insiders may trade on nonpublic information, that declaration allows insiders
to initiate price movements useful to the general public without having to link
them to the Timmins site. In response, it could be argued that the only source
of market inaccuracy in these cases is a short delay in the correction of stock
prices, a cost that is worth bearing to protect against various sources of insider
26. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
27. Id. at 843-44.
28. Cf James D. Cox, Giving Tippers a Pass: U.S. v. Newman, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Jan. 27,
2015), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2015/ol/27/giving-tippers-a-pass-u-s-v-newman
-3 [http://perma.cc/4KVJ-NM7R]. I agree with James Cox's conclusion that Newman is
wrong to the extent that it holds that "selective disclosures based on family relation or
friendship are not alone a breach unless there is some realized or expected objective material
financial gain on the part of the tipper." Id. No benefit should be required. See infra text
accompanying notes 74-82.
ag. See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 21, at 867-68.
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abuse.30 But at the same time, the social cost of the delay may be great even if
the time until correction is short. This outcome is possible whenever other
parties in related businesses make major decisions to the detriment of the firm
right after the prompt disclosure of the information. Thus in Texas Gulf
Sulphur, nearby landowners could raise the prices that they charge for mineral
leases. It is hard to know in the abstract what the right answer is, and it could
well be that contractual disclosure norms in the absence of the current SEC
prohibitions would evolve if the risk of unjust insider enrichment were not
offset by some gain to the firm at large. It is therefore possible that consensual
arrangements would reach the same position that the law requires today-
namely, that the insider must live with the choice to either disclose or abstain
from trading." Under government regulation, the disclosures have to be full,
but it is possible that in some situations it may be wiser for insiders to disclose
that they have either bought or sold, without explaining why. Or, perhaps,
some limits could be placed on the number of shares that various key figures
are allowed to purchase, or the number of options they may be allowed to
acquire.
These permutations could set up a yellow flag to others without disclosing
the information in question and risking the flaws of Regulation FD. In one
sense, Texas Gulf Sulphur is the exceptional situation because it involves buying
on good news, not selling on bad news. Even in the latter situation, the firm
might be able to limit shareholder losses by inducing price signals, but it is
harder to think of scenarios in which it seems clearly wise to abandon the
disclose-or-abstain position of modern law.
There is also a third scenario in which it appears that the securities laws do
impose excessive liability on insiders. This is the dilemma that corporate
insiders face when they are asked whether the firm is in play, as in Basic Inc. v.
Levinson, which held that insiders could be sued under the insider trading laws
when they falsely denied that the company was engaged in merger negotiations
even when they did not trade in the stock.' At this point, the risk of self-
aggrandizement is gone, so the actions in question could be justified as the
only way to secure the confidentiality needed to increase the odds that the deal
could go through. Quite simply, if the information becomes public, the stock
30. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of "Inaccurate" Stock Prices, 41
DuKE L.J. 977, 988-89 (1992).
31. This rule resulted from the judicial interpretation of Rule 1ob-5. See Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401
F.2d at 848; Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 6668, 1961 WL 60638 (Nov. 8,
1961).
32. 485 U.S. 224, 24o n.18 (1988).
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price of the target moves upward, which will in turn make the deal less
attractive to the acquiring corporation.
In these circumstances, it seems appropriate to allow the directors to
determine in good faith whether it was proper to deny the existence of
transactions. In practice, firms are able to take one effective countermeasure,
which is to announce in advance a uniform policy of never commenting on
possible takeover transactions, which in this context at least allows them to
avoid potential liability under the fraud-on-the-market theory, which is still
very much in an unhappy state of flux." But even in the cases where that
theory is allowed to operate, it surely cannot make sense to have a regime in
which the insiders have to compensate in full all those shareholders who sold
in ignorance of the information, without being able to recoup the gains from
the outsiders who were fortunate enough to gain from the delay in the release
of the information. Whatever the social losses from the delayed release of the
pricing information, it is far smaller than the potential liability under the
securities law.
Whatever the ideal solution, however, I see no comparative advantage in
having the SEC decide once and for all what the ideal strategy is in cases of this
sort, especially as a criminal matter. More specifically, there is little reason to
credit the view that insider trading, if subject only to contractual limitations,
should be regarded as a threat to the integrity of the U.S. securities market.
That proposition would be true if the patterns of trading by insiders were not
disclosed in advance. But once the key corporate documents reveal the relevant
information about insider trades, the market has more information about what
will happen rather than less. The common SEC position on this point, as
follows, ignores the issue of advance disclosure:
It is the trading that takes place when those privileged with confidential
information about important events use the special advantage of that
knowledge to reap profits or avoid losses on the stock market, to the
detriment of the source of the information and to the typical investors
33. See, e.g., Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2185 (20n) ("[Under
the fraud-on-the-market theory,] the market price of shares traded on well-developed
markets reflects all publicly available information, and, hence, any material
misrepresentations. Because the market transmits information to the investor in the
processed form of a market price, (the court] can assume . .. that an investor relies on
public misstatements whenever he buys or sells stock at the price set by the market."
(citations omitted)).
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who buy or sell their stock without the advantage of "inside"
information.'
This passage sets out the conventional rationale for the prohibition on
insider trading. Its great vice is that it frames the issue in terms of dealing with
the gains to the insiders relative to the losses to other parties. By casting the
issue in this fashion, the SEC necessarily expands its role and that of the
Department of Justice until they can become perpetual censors of all that goes
on in the day-to-day operation of markets, without clearly explaining how it is
that ordinary investors, many of whom are clients of the firms charged with
criminal offenses, are themselves helped by the government action. The SEC
pronouncement makes it appear as though the central calculation concerns the
distribution of benefits and losses to various players; the one social objective of
the insider trading rules, however, is to improve the pricing of shares and thus
the long-term market effectiveness, which redounds ex ante to the benefit of all
market participants. More concretely, there is no reason to worry about any
"detriment to the source of the information" who is in a position to take care of
himself by contract. Nor is there any reason to worry about the position of the
public at large, all of whose members can organize their trading strategies with
full knowledge of the permissible activities of the insiders by looking to the
corporate policy on insider trades.
The counterstrategies are legion. One strategy that is available to small
investors is to adopt a buy-and-hold strategy in which they keep, at low
administrative costs, a balanced portfolio. The portfolio allows them to share in
favorable price movements generated by insiders (and the cost of sharing
unfavorable movements as well) without having specific knowledge of those
events. Another approach is for typical investors to buy shares in a mutual fund
that is run by managers who are familiar with the intricacies of the
marketplace, and thus can fend for their shareholders. A large information
problem is thus displaced by a much smaller agency cost problem. Finally,
these shareholders are entitled to all the protections against various forms of
insider trading that a firm imposes on its insiders in order to induce others to
invest in capital markets. The SEC does not have to mount a charge to protect
typical investors who in modern capital markets have cheaper and more
effective ways to protect themselves. The narrower focus on controlling
34. Thomas C. Newkirk, Assoc. Dir., Div. of Enft, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n. & Melissa A.
Robertson, Senior Counsel, Div. of Enft, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n., Insider Trading-A U.S.
Perspective, Speech by SEC Staff at the 16th International Symposium on Economic
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traditional forms of fraud offers a far higher rate of return on public
administrative dollars than the SEC's preferred method.
B. The Classical and Misappropriation Theories ofinsider Trading
The shakiness of the basic SEC position is revealed by a closer examination
of today's common typology that distinguishes between the classical form of
insider trading and its misappropriation variation. Both theories received their
canonical formulation in the 1997 decision of United States v. O'Hagan":
Under the "traditional" or "classical theory" of insider trading liability,
§ io(b) and Rule lob-5 are violated when a corporate insider trades in
the securities of his corporation on the basis of material, nonpublic
information. Trading on such information qualifies as a "deceptive
device" under § io(b), we have affirmed, because "a relationship of
trust and confidence [exists] between the shareholders of a corporation
and those insiders who have obtained confidential information by
reason of their position with that corporation." That relationship, we
recognized, "gives rise to a duty to disclose [or to abstain from trading]
because of the 'necessity of preventing a corporate insider from . . .
tak[ing] unfair advantage of .. . uninformed . . . stockholders."' The
classical theory applies not only to officers, directors, and other
permanent insiders of a corporation, but also to attorneys, accountants,
consultants, and others who temporarily become fiduciaries of a
corporation.
The "misappropriation theory" holds that a person commits fraud "in
connection with" a securities transaction, and thereby violates § 1o(b)
and Rule iob-5, when he misappropriates confidential information for
securities trading purposes, in breach of a duty owed to the source of
the information. Under this theory, a fiduciary's undisclosed, self-
serving use of a principal's information to purchase or sell securities, in
breach of a duty of loyalty and confidentiality, defrauds the principal of
the exclusive use of that information. In lieu of premising liability on a
fiduciary relationship between company insider and purchaser or seller
of the company's stock, the misappropriation theory premises liability
on a fiduciary-turned-trader's deception of those who entrusted him
with access to confidential information.
35- 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
36. Id. at 651-52 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
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This oft-quoted passage bristles with conceptual difficulties. I shall look at
them first in connection with the immediate parties to the transaction, and
then extend them to deal with the vexing question of the tippees, the subject of
the prosecution in Newman.
1. Insiders
The difficulty with the so-called classical theory is that it does not take into
account the notion that the fiduciary duties in question sound in contract, not
in regulatory fiat." So long as there are appropriate disclosures in advance as to
the rules of the game, there is no deception and hence no manipulation within
the meaning of the securities law. Nor is it appropriate to say that the insiders
have taken advantage of "uninformed shareholders," because the level of
knowledge that the shareholders acquire is not externally fixed for all time but
rather depends heavily on the rules of the game in which trading takes place.
Thus, all parties have to acquire some information before they decide to trade,
and how they acquire that information greatly depends on the known legal
environment in which the market operates. Where the insiders announce that
they will trade, that information will be incorporated into the market as
individuals change their pattern of trading, or, more commonly, hire other
people to do the trading for them (perhaps by using brokers or investing in
mutual funds with professional management). The breach of fiduciary duty
should be confined to those cases where the behavior of insiders is contrary to
their stated positions. Otherwise, there is no "unfair advantage" at all. In
general, a comprehensive theory of insider trading has no place for the classical
theory about the misuse of material nonpublic information, unless this
potential ground for liability is waivable by the corporation's shareholders,
which under current law it decidedly is not.
The position of insiders under the misappropriation theory is quite
different. In these cases, the party who has taken advantage of the inside
information is someone who receives that information as part and parcel of his
duties on behalf of the firm. At this point, the use of this information by its
recipient does not cause any harm to the market at large. Indeed, by trading on
accurate information, the new trader improves the accuracy of market pricing,
making the overall market even more efficient. But the correct focus of the
misappropriation theory has nothing to do with outsiders to the firm. It has to
do with the damage that the recipient of the information does when he trades
against the interests of his two principals - the firm for which he works and the
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information not only causes short-term dislocations, but it also reduces the
frequency of deals by making it harder to organize them in secrecy, as in the
Basic situation. 8 But that huge risk is no mystery. It is all too well known to
principals everywhere who understand the "agency cost" risk, given that the
agent's incentives are never perfectly aligned with those of the principal. 9 It
should come therefore as no surprise that, in many cases, we observe even
today sharp limitations on the use of information that are privately imposed to
ensure that employees who receive valuable inside information from their
firms' clients do not use that information to hurt either their firm or its
clients .40
In this instance the need for public enforcement is much reduced. But it
need not be eliminated. In the first instance, it may well be that the firm in
question needs to rely on the SEC to turn over information that the agency
holds in its system, which allows the firm to learn of all trades made by those
persons with whom it has trusted information. If so, then its contracts could
specify that the firm will rely on the SEC to do its detective work. Indeed, it
could go further and indicate that it clearly supports criminal prosecution for
the abuses of information. Yet again, it is dangerous to conclude a priori that a
firm would choose to turn to the SEC for all or part of its enforcement
business. It could instead rely on its own internal reporting requirements -for
example, turning over brokerage statements and tax returns, and relying on
exchange data- to gain the needed information. Or it could find some other
private firm, which specializes in this line of compliance work, to whom it
could delegate its inspection and monitoring work. Indeed, that work could be
done by the exchanges themselves, which could make clear what practices must
be followed in order to be listed. Individual firms often require that their
employees make available to them all their own private financial records and
those of their family members as well. In general, therefore, in an unregulated
setting the first line of defense is likely to be private. Subject to some
38. See supra text accompanying notes 32-33.
3g. The classic citation is Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECoN. 305 (1976).
40. See infra text accompanying notes 54-56 (providing examples of such limitations).
41. See, e.g., Manny Rivera, Best Practices for Drafting Insider Trading Policies, LAW36o (July 1,
2015, 2:50 PM), http://www.1aw360.com/articles/674725/best-practices-for-drafting-insider
-trading-policies [http://perma.cc/QDS7-SBBX] (providing guidance for companies
drafting insider policies, and suggesting, among other things, that a standard device is for
companies to "require special insiders (including family members and other members of
their respective households) to obtain prior clearance from the company before buying,
selling or engaging in any transaction in company securities").
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complications addressed later,"' criminal law may well be invoked in cases of
misappropriation of what are in essence firm trade secrets, just as it may be
invoked in any other case of employee misappropriation of corporate assets.
The theory of criminal liability for this trade secret information is similar to
that applicable to the embezzlement of corporate funds. There is of course no
reason why the government criminal prosecution requires the cooperation of
the corporation in this, any more than in other cases of misappropriation or
theft. The government can decide to prosecute for the misappropriation even if
the corporation does not, although the government may in practice be less
willing to do so.
The basic points of this analysis are well illustrated by the facts in O'Hagan,
in which the Supreme Court accepted the misappropriation theory of securities
fraud." O'Hagan was a lawyer for the Minneapolis firm Dorsey & Whitney.s
O'Hagan knew that Dorsey & Whitney's client, a British company, Grand
Metropolitan ("Grand Met"), was planning a tender offer for Pillsbury.46 Both
Dorsey & Whitney and Grand Met took steps to keep Grand Met's proposed
tender offer under wraps.47 O'Hagan did no work on the deal but acquired
both stock and options in Pillsbury during the period that Dorsey & Whitney
represented Grand Met.' After Dorsey & Whitney withdrew from its
representation, Grand Met made public its tender offer, which drove up the
price of both the shares and options, which O'Hagan then sold, reaping a
profit in excess of $4.3 million.49 O'Hagan knew that the transaction was
confidential.so
42. See infra text accompanying notes 56-63.
43. See 18 U.S.C. § 1832 (2012). Titled "Theft of trade secrets," the section states:
(a) Whoever, with intent to convert a trade secret, that is related to a product or
service used in or intended for use in interstate or foreign commerce, to the
economic benefit of anyone other than the owner thereof, and intending or
knowing that the offense will, injure any owner of that trade secret, knowingly-
(1) steals, or without authorization appropriates, takes, carries away, or
conceals, or by fraud, artifice, or deception obtains such information; ...
shall, except as provided in subsection (b), be fined under this title or imprisoned
not more than 1o years, or both.
Id.
44. See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 65o (1997).
45. Id. at 647.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See id at 647-48.
49. See id.
ro. See id. at 648.
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Wholly apart from any of the finer points of securities laws, it is clear that
Grand Met supplied this information to its lawyers and investment advisors so
they could use it only for Grand Met's benefit in the tender offer. It was equally
clear that Grand Met had to invest considerable resources to determine that the
tender offer made sense. Grand Met also knew that the price of its tender offer
would have to rise if other individuals found out about its interest in Pillsbury,
which is why it insisted that all parties who worked on the transaction would
not appropriate that information for their own benefit. This was not a close
case. Wholly apart from the securities law, it is quite inconceivable that any
employment agreement would allow a company agent to bid up the price of a
target against his principal on the strength of the information that the agent
acquired from its client. The standard duty of loyalty requires that such
information not be used in ways that hurt the client. It is an open question
whether the early purchases of Pillsbury stock hurt the public at large. But the
answer to that question does not matter to the employer or client. The harm to
a trading partner in breach of contract is always actionable regardless. Left
unexplained is why the SEC has to get into the middle of this fight by setting
employee standards.
The general lesson on insider misappropriation is this: any firm that uses
inside information to trade against its own customers will not last long in the
marketplace, as potential clients will move elsewhere for their business. Here is
the proof: all law firms and all investment banks have elaborate rules in place
that limit the ability of their partners and associates to trade on information
they acquire in the ordinary course of business, many of which right now go
beyond the SEC requirements." At this level reputational constraints are so
powerful that any lawyer, banker, or accountant caught using confidential
information for his own benefit would be signing his professional death
warrant. The problem of the misuse of confidential information of course goes
beyond the securities context, so the security-specific rules are often
supplemented by legal constraints on the overall practice of law, which
imposes, most notably, duties of confidentiality for lawyer-client
communications 2 and work product privilege.s" It is unlikely that the SEC is
si. For a general, if dated, survey of the policies for law firms, see Harvey L. Pitt et al., ABA
Subcomm. on Civil Litig. & SEC Enft Matters, Law Firm Policies Regarding Trading and
Confidentiality, 47 Bus. LAw. 235 (1991). See also infra note 54 and accompanying text
(discussing the policies in place at Goldman Sachs).
sz. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR Ass'N 1983). Model Rule 1.6 Comment 2
states: "A fundamental principle in the client-lawyer relationship is that, in the absence of
the client's informed consent, the lawyer must not reveal information relating to the
representation." Id. r. 1.6 cmt. 2.
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the best actor to catch the odd case that might slip through these two types of
sanctions, given the strong private incentives to make sure that errors of this
sort do not happen.
For example, in one recent account, Goldman Sachs took prophylactic steps
"to block bankers and other employees from trading individual stocks and debt
securities in their own personal accounts, or investing in certain hedge
funds."" For a firm whose practice extends to all market groups, the broad rule
is likely needed to assure Goldman that its traders will not trade against
Goldman itself with firm information, and it allows Goldman to reassure its
clients that their information will not go astray when entrusted to Goldman's
employees in a sensitive deal. For other firms with different business profiles,
perhaps a less restrictive rule on individual trading might do. But whether or
not this is true, the SEC does not have individualized information that allows it
to make more sensible determinations than those now made by market-driven
actors. If anything, the SEC's broad discretion gives it too much power to
decide which perceived violations of the law to chase after and which to ignore,
in ways that could lead to invidious favoritism of some parties over others.
Since the private-law response is so powerful, why go through tortured
reasoning to determine the scope of liability under Rule lob-5 for insider
trading? And is it wise to impose criminal sanctions if the firm has no desire to
do so?
It should be evident that the concerns with insider trading are most acute
with financial service firms, banks, and law firms, which constantly acquire
information from all sources as a routine part of their businesses. But virtually
every firm has an insider trading policy that is calibrated to the risks that it
faces. For example, the Pitney Bowes insider trading policy takes a two-tier
approach in which more stringent preclearance obligations are imposed on
senior officials, called "restricted persons," before entering into any planned
transaction in Pitney Bowes securities. NetLogic Microsystems, Inc. has a
general prohibition against insider trading, coupled with an injunction
53 See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947); cf MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUcT r. 1.6
cmt. 3 ("The attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine apply in judicial and other
proceedings in which a lawyer may be called as a witness or otherwise required to produce
evidence concerning a client.").
54. Justin Baer, Goldman Puts New Limits on Some Employee Trades, WALL ST. J.
(Sept. 26, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/goldman-to-limit-some-employee-trading
-of-stocks-debt-1411772889 [http://perma.cc/N5L4-BRSC].
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directing employees who have questions about the policy to contact the chief
financial officer.ss
Against this backdrop, O'Hagan represents a situation in which the
application of the securities laws is redundant in light of the specific
contractual prohibitions on the use of this information. These rules, moreover,
form part of a larger set of institutional arrangements intended to protect
confidential information. Thus, the misuse of that information is also covered
by the usual rules of corporate law that impose duties of loyalty and care on
directors and key officers. In the absence of any explicit waiver, the duty of
loyalty surely applies to O'Hagan's actions as an agent of the company.7
Ironically, the securities case law ties itself into knots in order to come up with
the right answer. Its first move is to distinguish between the "classical" form of
insider trading, like that in Texas Gulf Sulphur, where insiders trade firm stock
on inside information, from cases where the stock traded is that of another
company (in O'Hagan, the target of Dorsey & Whitney's own client). At this
point, the applicable theory is that the case involves the conversion of inside
information to purposes that are prohibited by the owner of the information.
The problem here is a very old one when dealing with tangible objects.
Under Roman law, it was held that any knowingly unauthorized use of a
chattel constituted a form of theft, which was then a delictual offense - a rough
cross between a civil and criminal sanction -that allowed the injured party to
recover multiple damages for the actual loss.s8 The rule had its inevitable
ambiguity, for it is not crystal clear that entering a borrowed horse in the
steeplechase is outside the scope of the original loan. But given the extra risk,
that conclusion seems clear enough. The unauthorized use of information
should be treated exactly as the unauthorized use of chattel. Whether or not
there is an explicit policy, using the information against the principal is a
virtual per se violation of the employee's contractual duties. It is therefore odd
that securities law has to go into flights of conceptual fancy before it concludes,
quite simply, that "[t]he undisclosed misappropriation of [confidential]
information, in violation of a fiduciary duty . . . constitutes fraud akin to
embezzlement-"'the fraudulent appropriation to one's own use of the money
56. See Code of Business Conduct and Ethics for Employees, Executive Officers and Directors,
NETLOGIC MICROSYSTEMS, INC., http://public.thecorporatelibrary.net/ethics/ethlo7495
.pdf [http://perma.cc/BYA6-Q4Z3].
57. For the leading statement, see Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
58. See 3 GAIus, INSTITUTES OF RoMAN LAW §§ 196-97 (Edward Poste trans., 4th ed. 1991). The
term "delict" is a literal translation of the Roman "ex delicto," and it refers typically to the
private enforcement of conduct by a civil and not a criminal action.
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or goods entrusted to one's care by another.""' 5 ' The exact same principles that
apply to the misappropriation of a chattel apply to the misappropriation of a
trade secret. There is no need to reinvent the wheel on issues that have already
been resolved.
Therein lies the correct starting point: treat the law of fiduciary duties as
the baseline for Rule 1ob-5. The hard question here is whether the breach of
these contractual duties of loyalty should be regarded as serious enough to
merit criminal prosecution. It is easy enough to imagine situations where that
might be the case. One of the most serious difficulties in the law of insider
trading is that any given bit of information is of equal value to all comers,
regardless of the income that they derive from the firm. The point is important
because it indicates that private sanctions, such as dismissal or demotion, will
not hit all employees equally. To take a highly stylized example, assume that
certain information is worth $100,ooo. A low-level assistant in the mailroom
will think that the loss of $30,000 in salary is a small price to pay for using the
illicit information. A trader that makes $i million may well take the opposite
view, at least on these stylized facts. Yet it does not follow that criminal
sanctions are unnecessary in these contexts because the same information could
easily be worth more to the high-placed insider who has greater capital to
invest. But by the same token, the low-level employee could connect with
outsiders who have capital in order to increase his earnings.
The implications here are hard to sort out. The first lesson is that
prevention and monitoring are critical across the board, which is why the
Goldman board takes the position it does. The second lesson is that, in any
given case, ordinary criminal sanctions for theft can be imposed on all insiders,
whether rich or poor, who take advantage of trade secret information. In this
regard, the problem here is no different from that involving embezzlement of a
constant sum of money, which is always a larger temptation for a low-income
employee who has less to lose than a high-level one. But there is no reason to
have a special SEC regulation to deal with these situations after the fact. The
s9. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 654 (1997) (citing Carpenter v. United States, 484
U.S. 19, 27 (1987)). Carpenter involved the conviction of the roommate of R. Foster Winans,
who shared information that he acquired for his Heard on the Street column in advance of
publication for trading purposes. The misappropriation theory was championed in an article
by Barbara Bader Aldave. Barbara Bader Aldave, Misappropriation: A General Theory of
Liability for Trading on Nonpublic Information, 13 HOFSTRA L. REv. 101, 102 (1984) ("This
Article argues that the misappropriation theory provides a convincing rationale for finding
that outsiders violate Rule iob- 5 when they trade on the basis of nonpublic information that
has been entrusted to them with the expectation that they will hold it in confidence and
refrain from acting upon it, and that the theory also provides the best rationale for the
disclose-or-abstain obligation of insiders and their tippees."). Her article was heavily relied
on in O'Hagan. See, e.g., O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653-54.
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usual rules of criminal law on misappropriation should be able to cover the case
every bit as well.
In other cases, it is somewhat less clear that the behavior is serious enough
to merit criminal prosecution. For example, R. Foster Winans was convicted of
insider trading for taking information that he received for the Wall Street
journal's "Heard on the Street" column and supplying it before publication to
third parties who then traded on that information in anticipation of the
column's effect on the market.so The breach of fiduciary duty seems clear. At
this point, criminal liability seems to follow for the knowing misappropriation.
What is less clear is how the matter would be resolved if approval of the Wall
Street Journal were somehow needed for the government to commence its
prosecution. Would the Wall Street Journal have been prepared to write a
contract with Winans stipulating that if the information were used to facilitate
insider trading by others, Winans would be subject to criminal sanctions? If so,
then the case is easy. But perhaps the Wall Street Journal would have
considered it sufficient deterrence to dismiss Winans, demote him, or dock his
pay, knowing that strong reputational sanctions would prevent him from
getting another job in the industry.
As ever, the mixture of remedies is hard to determine a priori. Indeed, part
of the difficulty lies in the changes in social perceptions of the
misappropriation of trade secrets. Winans's actions took place in 1983,61 at a
time when trade secret misappropriation had "been the near-exclusive province
of state civil law, usually in the form of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act . .. 62
But the legal landscape changed radically with the passage of the Economic
Espionage Act of 1996, which imposed federal criminal liability for the
misappropriation of trade secrets. In dealing with this background set of
expectations, the argument for criminal sanctions was weaker when Winans's
case was decided than it is today. In 1983, it seems unlikely that the various
parties who supplied the column with sensitive information would have
demanded that criminal sanctions be imposed on Winans. The problem here is
an old one.
The solution to any enforcement problem always seems easy to those
government agencies that think underdeterrence is the only game in town. The
choice of remedy becomes vastly more complicated when one acknowledges
6o. See Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 23-24.
61. Id. at 23.
62. James D. Veltrop, Trade Secret Misappropriation A Federal Crime, INTELL. PROP. TODAY 6
(June 1997), http://www.axinn.com/media/article/22_Veltrop 2o6-97.pdf [http://perma.cc
/ 5 FKN-HJLC] (footnote omitted).
63. Economic Espionage Act of1996, Pub. L. No. 104 -29 4 , 11o Stat. 3488.
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that there are two forms of error, and that overdeterrence -especially criminal
sanctions in particular cases - may cause negative externalities. So if we think
of the insider trading laws as a cocked gun in the cupboard of private parties,
the distress call to the government for criminal sanctions is unlikely to go out
very often. Private parties are likely to prefer working within a framework that
combines a private set of ex ante precautions, ex post firm sanctions, and a
large reputational hit. Yet even though the general legal climate has moved
toward criminal sanctions, it is less likely that private firms, such as Goldman
Sachs, would move toward that solution if left to their own devices.
2. Tippees
The next part of this inquiry addresses the systematic treatment of
tippees-i.e., third parties who receive information from an admitted insider.
The problem in question can arise with either of the two canonical forms of
insider trading, the classical and misappropriation theories, assuming these to
be otherwise viable. To understand the correct approach, it is critical to
understand that the parallels to the law of chattels, conversion, and trust work
as well as they do in the case where the insiders themselves use the information
in question.
On this question, the seminal Supreme Court decision in Dirks v. SEC lays
down an underinclusive rule that insider liability extends to any outsiders who
"have entered into a special confidential relationship in the conduct of the
business of the enterprise and are given access to information solely for
corporate purposes."6 ' But the Court in Dirks then qualified this proposition
by invoking its earlier decision in Chiarella v. United States6 s to say that "there
can be no duty to disclose where the person who has traded on inside
information 'was not [the corporation's] agent, . . . was not a fiduciary, [or]
was not a person in whom the sellers [of the securities] had placed their trust
and confidence.' 66 This includes the printer in Chiarella who misappropriated
information that he had acquired while working as a "markup man" preparing
documents about a pending corporate takeover. The argument in Dirks and
Chiarella was that to extend the duty beyond fiduciaries would necessarily
result in "recognizing a general duty between all participants in market
transactions to forgo actions based on material, nonpublic information."6 7 That
refusal to extend the prohibition against misappropriation beyond fiduciaries is
64. 463 U.S. 646, 655 f.14 (1983).
65- 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
66. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 654 (alterations in original) (quoting Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232).
67. Id. at 655 (quoting Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233).
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all too favorable to the tippee because it ignores the important intermediate
case where the third party, like Chiarella or O'Hagan, receives information that
he knows he should not use for his personal gain. In dealing with this issue,
there is much to be said in favor of Rule lob 5-2, which gives a broad account of
which individuals should be subject to a duty of trust and confidence, by
stressing both actual agreement on the one hand and shared expectations from
a course of dealing on the other.
The strength of this particular rule against misappropriation has deep roots
outside securities markets. In other contexts, the gains from that
misappropriation should be treated as being held in a constructive trust, with a
duty to turn such gains over to the proper holder of the information.6' The
term "constructive" in this situation is there for a purpose. An instructive
parallel is the term "constructive notice."'o It is quite clear that parties who take
property with actual notice that they cannot receive it have engaged in
misappropriation. It is equally clear that in many cases a party has enough
information to know that there is a serious risk that the party who claims to
own the property does not. Just that happens when A claims to have title to sell
land on which B is now living.' The same notion applies when the purchaser
of property can learn of the legal state of the title by an inspection of public
68. See Duties of Trust or Confidence in Misappropriation Insider Trading Cases, 17 C.F.R. 5
24o.1ob5 -2 (2015) ("(b) Enumerated 'duties oftrust or confidence.' For purposes of this section,
a 'duty of trust or confidence' exists in the following circumstances, among others: (1)
Whenever a person agrees to maintain information in confidence; (2) Whenever the person
communicating the material nonpublic information and the person to whom it is
communicated have a history, pattern, or practice of sharing confidences, such that the
recipient of the information knows or reasonably should know that the person
communicating the material nonpublic information expects that the recipient will maintain
its confidentiality... .").
69. See Constructive Trust, BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY (ioth ed. 2014) ("An equitable remedy ...
commonly used when the person holding the property acquired it by fraud, or when
property obtained by fraud or theft (as with embezzled money) is exchanged for other
property to which the wrongdoer gains title. The court declares a constructive trust in favor
of the victim of the wrong, who is given a right to property rather than a claim for
damages.").
70. Constructive Notice, BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (soth ed. 2014) ("Notice arising by
presumption of law from the existence of facts and circumstances that a party had a duty to
take notice of, such as registered deed or a pending lawsuit; notice presumed by law to have
been acquired by a person and thus imputed to that person.").
71. See, e.g., Waldorff Ins. & Bonding, Inc. v. Eglin Nat'l Bank, 453 So. 2d 1383 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1984) (discussing how the physical occupation of a condominium provides
constructive notice of a party's property interest).
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records.' At this point, the potential buyer is under a duty to inquire further to
discover the true state of the title. Once again, the use of the term
"constructive" concedes that there is no actual knowledge, but that the duty is
nonetheless imposed so that the potential buyer cannot turn a blind eye to a
risk of which he is or should be aware.
The same approach applies to the constructive trust. This relationship is
routinely imposed on third parties who receive chattels or land that they know
to be, or of which they have constructive knowledge is, owned by someone
else. There is no implication that they have voluntarily assumed any fiduciary
duties to the true owner of the property. Quite the opposite: it is well known
that they have no such intentions at all. But the obligation of a fiduciary is to
preserve the asset value for the beneficiary. That same duty should be imposed
under a theory of unjust enrichment against any party who is in possession of
stolen information that he knows is not his. Hence the constructive trust is
imposed to force him to act as if he were a trustee, which means that he must
make restitution of the monies received (and any gains derived from their use)
to their rightful owner. Indeed, generally the duty is so strong that the
constructive trustee is faced with the following no-win alternatives. If he takes
the money or other property and invests it in a risky venture, he loses either
way. If the investment goes up in value, he pays over the full amount. If it goes
down in value, then he must pay back the original sum with interest.
These arguments extend to the transfer of information to tippees that they
know or should have known to be illegally taken. The tippees are treated as
though they are trustees and thus have to turn over all their winnings to the
true owner of the property, a rule that applies with full force to the defendant
printer in Chiarella. This rule does not require, as Dirks intimates, that all
players be on an equal footing in securities markets. Quite the opposite: it only
deals with people who receive illegal disclosures of information. In a world
devoid of Regulation FD, the imposition of a constructive trust for
misappropriated information does not require a firm to make disclosures either
to all or to none, but leaves that decision in private hands. The constructive
trust language that is appropriate for Chiarella no more upsets the market for
the sale and use of information in securities markets than the parallel duties
upset the markets for the sale and use of land, chattels, or any other property
that can be illicitly converted. Dirks thus runs sharply counter to the private
law, and should be rejected on this point as all too favorable to the tippee who
trades improperly on inside information. Whether its rejection creates the case
72. See Joseph Boucek, Constructive Notice Afforded by the Records of Instruments Relating to Real
Property, 14 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 303, 304 (1936). For the principle in operation, see Harper v.
Paradise, 210 S.E.2d 710 (Ga. 1974).
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for criminal sanctions is a separate question to be analyzed on the same
grounds as above.7
Dirks also misfires on the question of whether proof of a violation of insider
trading prohibitions would require that the tippee of information supply some
return benefit to the party who supplied the tip. Once again, the rules that
govern information are similar to those that govern other forms of property,
such that the donee who takes with knowledge is again subject to the trust
whether or not he supplied some nonpecuniary benefit to the tipper. In
contrast, Dirks stands for the following canonical proposition:
Whether disclosure is a breach of duty therefore depends in large part
on the purpose of the disclosure . . . . Thus, the test is whether the
insider personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his
disclosure. Absent some personal gain, there has been no breach of duty
to stockholders. And absent a breach by the insider, there is no
derivative breach.74
Stated at that level of unguarded generality, the proposition must be
wrong; the test of criminal liability is too restrictive. Here once again, analogies
to ordinary fiduciary duties of trustees and directors, so useful in dealing with
the conversion analogies, help clarify the situation. Under the standard rules of
trust, any person who receives property, including shares of stock, will be
subject to the trust unless he is a bona fide purchaser for the value of the legal
interest in the property in question.' The point of these requirements is to
impress the (constructive) trust on two classes of individuals who receive a
trust property from the trustees. The first are purchasers with knowledge that the
trustee does not have the authority to sell. They are co-conspirators and not
innocent purchasers. The second are the donees of the property, who will have
to surrender it back to the trust for the simple reason that no person is allowed
to make gifts to his friends of property that is owned by another. "Be just
before you were generous" was the way the point was put to me many years
ago by Yale's late bankruptcy professor, J. William Moore. The question of
"derivative liability" is quite beside the point.
The question then arises as to whether the analysis ought to change when
what passes between parties is not property but information. The answer
seems to be that it should not. In the first place, some information, such as a
73. See the discussion of Winans, supra text accompanying notes 60-63.
74. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 662 (1983).
75. See, e.g., Caryl A. Yzenbaard et al., Constructive Trusts, in THE LAw OF TRUSTS AND TRusTEEs
§ 471 (Amy Morris Hess et al. eds., 2014).
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trade secret, is regarded as property,76 so that a straightforward application of
the rule that the beneficiary takes priority over the donee covers the case. But in
some instances the information may not qualify as a trade secret, yet here too
the equities apply between the parties.' Consider the example where an insider
in Texas Gulf Sulphur discloses information about the copper strike to a friend
down on his luck. The disclosure is not quid pro quo; it is not in payment for
some antecedent debt; it is not an effort to curry new business. It is just a gift,
for old times' sake, of information that both parties know should be used solely
for the advantage of the corporation. How could that not be an improper form
of trading on inside information, especially if both sides keep the transaction
secret from all corporate officials and do not share the information more
widely? At this point, any general rule that exonerates the donee or the insider
would be a bizarre affront to the traditional duty of loyalty.
Stated as a general proposition then, the rule in Dirks makes no sense. Yet
put into its peculiar factual context, the result makes a good deal of sense. As
Justice Powell noted in Dirks, the government's case turned on "extraordinary
facts," insofar as the recipient of the information, Ray Dirks, who learned it
from former Equity employee Ronald Secrist, made the disclosures in 1973 to
expose widespread fraud at Equity Funding of America.' The information
generated was widely shared and discussed among potential analysts, some of
whom sold stock on the strength of the rumors before they became public. As
is common in these cases, Dirks did not just come up with this information in a
void, but relied on Secrist for the key information. In such cases, a better
approach carves out an exception to the general rule that disclosures to donees
normally constitute a breach of fiduciary duty. The obvious point of distinction
is that Dirks did not trade on the information, let alone trade for his own
benefit, but used it to expose fraud to great public benefit. In general, the value
of any inside information for trading purposes varies inversely with the
number of people who obtain that information. Dirks supplied key
information from which someone had to benefit and someone had to lose as
the shares of Equity Funding fell back to their proper value. All Dirks did was
hasten the removal of market error from which he obtained no advantage.
76. See, for example, Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984), which, while right on
this one point, was as wrong as can be on the question of whether a government agent can
hold back a permit unless the owner of the trade secret agrees to share it with competitors.
That issue was ducked by Chief Justice Roberts in Horne v. Department ofAgriculture, 133 S.
Ct. 2053 (2013).
-7. See Cox, supra note 28 (making the same point).
78. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662.
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Does it make sense that for this conduct he received a criminal prosecution,
even one in which the SEC only censured him but did not ask for jail time?o
Nothing in Dirks undermines the general proposition that donees should not
be allowed to trade on inside information obtained from an insider in breach of
fiduciary duty. But it does point to the necessity of creating principled, if
limited, exceptions to cover those donees who supply social benefits, especially
when they do not trade on the information they have gathered to their own
personal advantage. Someone has to benefit from the sudden disclosure of this
potent information, and the law should not care unduly about that party's
identity.
A similar analysis applies to the second explanation that Justice Powell gave
for adding in the personal-benefit rule, which gets to the heart of Regulation
FD (which still lay sixteen years in the future). Justice Powell observed that
some special provision had to be made to protect market letters and other
devices used to communicate information to the firm. "It is the nature of this
type of information, and indeed of the markets themselves, that such
information cannot be made simultaneously available to all of the corporation's
stockholders or the public generally." 8 ' The best way to defend that conclusion
is to note the flexible nature of fiduciary duties under the business judgment
rule, which should apply here. The analysts are not beneficiaries to whom
insiders owe a duty of loyalty. Nor do these releases exhibit any hint of self-
dealing that gives rise to a rejection of the ordinary business judgment rule in
favor of the stricter fair-value rule, with its stringent procedural and
substantive components.
Under the ordinary business judgment rule, then, it should be perfectly
legal for the proper officials within the corporation to instruct their key
employees and analysts to share information with various groups, even if that
information cannot be, or is not, supplied "simultaneously" to all shareholders.
To be sure, any given instance of disclosure might make it impossible to release
all the information to the entire public at one time. But why should the
business judgment rule preclude the directors and officers of the corporation
so. "Recognizing, however, that Dirks 'played an important role in bringing [Equity Funding's]
massive fraud to light,' the SEC only censured him." Dirks, 463 U.S. at 651-52 (citation
omitted).
81. Id. at 659.
82. See, e.g., Ryan v. Tad's Enters., Inc., 709 A.2d 682, 690 (Del. Ch. 1996) ("Entire fairness has
two aspects: fair dealing and fair price. The Court must consider how the board of directors
discharged all of its fiduciary duties with regard to each aspect of the non-bifurcated
components of entire fairness . . . . In determining the transaction's overall fairness, the
Court will conduct a unified assessment that involves balancing the process and the price
aspects of the disputed transaction." (citations omitted)).
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from authorizing those selective disclosures? One good reason for allowing
them is that the partial release of information may spur interest in the stock,
which could on average lead to an increase in share prices overall-which
behind a veil of ignorance is a development that current shareholders should
welcome. It is a far cry from trading shares in O'Hagan on the strength of
confidential information in competition with the client that supplied it. Nor is
it correct in these cases to analyze any one meeting with, or disclosure from, an
insider in isolation. It thus makes perfectly good sense for a firm to entertain
one group of analysts on one occasion, and a second one later on, or to have
different representatives of any given firm meet with different analysts. It also
makes sense for other firms to engage in similar practices with their own
preferred clientele. There is with all forms of information a tradeoff between
the slower but more even distribution of information and a more rapid and
asymmetrical release. Exactly how public calls and private meetings should be
coordinated is hard to say in the abstract. But that is exactly the reason why
Regulation FD goes too far, as discussed further in Part III. It assumes that a
single paradigm should apply to all firms in all settings, without any concrete
knowledge of their distinct circumstances. To look only at ex post parity of
recipients is to ignore all dynamic features of the market, including those that
result in more rapid, accurate repricing of financial assets.
The result of the overall analysis should now be clear. Historically, the law
on insider trading rested on the assumption that any insider who trades on
material nonpublic information has acted in breach of his fiduciary duty to the
corporation and its shareholders. But that conclusion rests on a command from
the SEC, and not only on any duty that the corporate insiders have assumed.
The statement therefore is overbroad unless and until it is made clear that the
corporation has imposed, as it may well do, such duties that limit how insiders
may use nonpublic information. In contrast, the misappropriation theory is the
later comer to the law, having received the Supreme Court's blessing only in
O'Hagan in 1997. Yet here the pedigree for liability is far stronger insofar as
there is never any doubt that an employee who uses confidential information to
trade either against the firm or its clients is in breach of explicit and extensive
contractual duties, all of which are intended to protect the firm's trade secrets.
But the irony is this: the public at large has nothing to do with the
misappropriation theory. The losses there are solely private, such that the first
line of defense against breach is private as well. It is certainly appropriate in
this case to consider criminal liability for employees that act in breach of their
duties. But the source of concern is how theft of trade secrets undermines
efforts of firms to collect information about potential market moves. Ironically,
trading conducted in violation of fiduciary duties helps improve share prices to
the public at large, albeit at too great a social cost.
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III. A CRITIQUE OF REGULATION FD
At this point, the correct inquiry is whether Regulation FD could survive
examination as a matter of first principle. I put aside here the long dispute over
whether the SEC is entitled to deference in setting rules, in either criminal or
civil proceedings,8, in order to show why Regulation FD is at war with the
basic assumptions of the statute it is said to interpret. The first point is that
Regulation FD flies in the face of Dirks, which stated the exact opposite
conclusion with respect to communications between analysts and insiders. The
SEC is well aware of this point because, as it states in Regulation FD, "[t]he
regulation now includes an express provision in the text stating that a failure to
make a disclosure required solely by Regulation FD will not result in a
violation of Rule iob-5."8& Yet at the same time it notes that " [i]ssuer selective
disclosure bears a close resemblance in this regard to ordinary 'tipping' and
insider trading."8 s
Second, the broad reach of Regulation FD rests on a dubious statutory
balancing act. Indeed, it is far from clear where the SEC's authority to issue
this regulation comes from, given that the SEC gives no explanation for its
express reliance on multiple sections of various statutes, nor does it hint at
which provisions specifically cover this rule.86 It is not possible to extract
Regulation FD from Section 10(b), given that the section's focus is on "any
83. That debate turns on several questions. Most significant is the general rule of deference in
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), which I long have
opposed on the ground that it incorrectly takes questions of law away from courts. See
lucHARD A. EPSTEIN, DESIGN FOR LIBERTY: PRIVATE PROPERTY, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION,
AND TIHE RULE OF LAw 154-59 (2011). For a detailed expos6, see Jack M. Beermann, End the
Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be
Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REV. 779, 782-84 (2010). For an explanation of the refusal to extend
Chevron to criminal prosecution, see the forceful statement by Justice Scalia respecting the
denial of certiorari in Whitman v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 352 (2014), in which he stated that
"[a] court owes no deference to the prosecution's interpretation of a criminal law," id. at 353.
Justice Scalia rests that denial of deference largely on separation-of-powers grounds, which
in my view apply with equal force to ordinary administrative actions.
84. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,718 (Aug. 24, 2000)
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 24o, 243 & 249).
85. Id. at 51,716.
86. See id. at 51,737 ("We are adopting Regulation FD, the amendments to Form 8-K, Rule
iob5 -1, and Rule 10b5 -2 under the authority set forth in Sections 10, 19(a), and 28 of the
Securities Act, Sections 3, 9, 10, 13, 15, 23, and 36 of the Exchange Act, and Section 30 of the
Investment Company Act."). Note that there is no effort to disentangle the statutory
authority for Regulation FD and Rule lob5 -2. Nor is there any mention of specific language
in three separate acts that supports this particular vision of fair trading.
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manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance."" The SEC has substantial
regulatory authority in figuring out how to deal with these fraud-related risks.
One example of such deceptive devices is a wash trade, where parties stage fake
transactions, in which no risk is created or shifted, to deceive other individuals
about the market price of the traded security or the level of liquidity in the
market. The former happens, for example, by a public trade at a high price, and
a secret repurchase of the shares for the same price shortly thereafter. The latter
takes place when a party buys and sells the same shares under different names
in order to create a false impression of high market liquidity. But the SEC
does not have the same authority to take practices that are not deceptive and
manipulative and treat them as though they were. In particular, most firms
would most often want their key employees to speak to analysts in ways that
Regulation FD prohibits. 89
The defense of Regulation FD therefore must derive from the view that
imperfections in security markets are everywhere, so that any deviation from
the model of equality will necessarily work some kind of systematic fraud. One
key SEC argument in Regulation FD reads:
We believe that the practice of selective disclosure leads to a loss of
investor confidence in the integrity of our capital markets. Investors
who see a security's price change dramatically and only later are given
access to the information responsible for that move rightly question
whether they are on a level playing field with market insiders.9 o
And further:
The vast majority of these commenters consisted of individual
investors, who urged-almost uniformly-that we adopt Regulation
FD. Individual investors expressed frustration with the practice of
selective disclosure, believing that it places them at a severe
disadvantage in the market.9 '
87. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
8. For the improprieties of wash trading, see Wash Trading: Frequently Asked Questions,
NASDAQ http://business.nasdaq.com/Docs/98477_wash-trading-faq-.pdf [http://perma
.cc/Q3QR-23BQ.
ag. See Reply Brief of Defendant-Appellant Todd Newman at lo, United States v. Newman, 773
F.3d 438 (2014) (Nos. 13-1837-cr(L), 13-1917-cr(con)), 2013 WL 6827040, at *io; see also infra
text accompanying note 123.
go. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,716 (Aug. 24, 2000)
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On this view, Regulation FD is necessary to maintain confidence in the
securities markets. It is this view that drove the government's all-out
prosecution in Newman. As the government warned: "The consequences for
investor confidence are plain: individuals will perceive that cozy relationships
between insiders and the most sophisticated traders allow exploitation of
nonpublic information for personal gain.""
These reasons repudiate one sound warning against level playing fields in
Dirks, although the conflict between the rule and the earlier case is never made
explicit.9 3 Indeed, the rule appears to be inconsistent with Chiarella. Chiarella
rejected an earlier Second Circuit decision that had contended that "the federal
securities laws have created a system providing equal access to information
necessary for reasoned and intelligent investment decisions because [material
nonpublic] information gives certain buyers or sellers an unfair advantage over
less informed buyers and sellers."9 Chiarella further held that "not every
instance of financial unfairness constitutes fraudulent activity under § 1o(b).""
This last point is consistent with the view that no dynamic market is
perfectly competitive. Indeed, innovation depends on astute individuals
finding ways to take advantage of gaps in markets, and it is through their effort
to obtain extra returns that the system starts to hum. There are always
entrepreneurial individuals who invest resources in an effort to locate new bits
of information that will give them a leg up, which translates into higher rates
of return for greater amounts of work. The more people who seek to exploit
this information, the better markets will work. As stated in the Newman amicus
brief authored by Professors Stephen Bainbridge, Todd Henderson, and
Jonathan Macey, the information these entrepreneurs "obtain and pass on to
their clients enables more accurate pricing in capital markets and helps to
assure that capital will ultimately be allocated to the highest value users."g6
That flexibility could prove especially important to smallcap and midcap firms,
which, while publicly traded, are not normally followed by a cadre of analysts.
The prospect of some type of exclusive arrangement might increase analyst
interest in following these firms' stock. On balance, more information in a
ga. Petition of the United States of America for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc at 24,
Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (Nos. 13-1837(L), 13-1917(CON)), 2015 WL 1064423, at *24.
93. See, e.g., Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,726 ("Thus, for
example, liability for 'tipping' and insider trading under Rule iob-5 may still exist if a
selective disclosure is made in circumstances that meet the Dirks 'personal benefit' test.").
94. Newman, 773 F. 3 d at 449 (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232 (1980)).
95. Id.
96. Brief of Law Professors Stephen Bainbridge et al. as Amici Curiae in Opposition to Petition
for Rehearing at 5-6, Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (Nos. 13-18 3 7(L), 13-1917(CON)), 2015 WL
1o644o9, at *5-6.
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world where some firms - through their analysts - have the inside track may
well prove better than the alternative world where no investor has an incentive
to follow these firms' stocks at all. Once again, the question here is hard to
answer in the abstract. But there seems little doubt that the right answer might
well differ from case to case. If something like Regulation FD works to
stimulate interest in their firm, firms will adopt it voluntarily. If it does not,
they will tend to employ other strategies. So long as one-size-need-not-fit-all,
Regulation FD does not have a sensible role to play.
The SEC tries to additionally defend Regulation FD by stating that the rule
guards against conflicts of interest that may otherwise encourage "analysts [to]
predominantly issue 'buy' recommendations on covered issuers, because they
fear losing their access to selectively disclosed information."9 7  Under
Regulation FD, the standard practice is to open all calls from management to
anyone who wants to listen in. People may listen without speaking and
management may at any time decline to answer any question. At this point,
people can make their own decisions and recommendations without fearing
that they will be cut out entirely from all information about the firm. But by
the same token, it should be clear that all questioners will be more guarded in
their questions, knowing that they might publicly reveal some of the firm's
private information about either itself or the industry. It therefore could make
perfectly good sense to have some candid discussions in private in addition to
those which take place in public. Once again, the variety of situations makes it
highly unlikely that a one-size-fits-all approach works for all different parts of
the complex securities market.
Nor should Regulation FD be justified as an independent backstop to Rule
iob-5. In Regulation FD, the SEC treats the two provisions as complements.98
But Regulation FD is better understood as Rule lob-5's antithesis. As Professor
Aldave wrote: "The Chiarella-Dirks emphasis on fiduciary duties reflects the
97. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,717.
98. That complementarity is evident from the agency's summary of Regulation FD:
SUMMARY: The Securities and Exchange Commission is adopting new rules to
address three issues: the selective disclosure by issuers of material nonpublic
information; when insider trading liability arises in connection with a trader's
"use" or "knowing possession" of material nonpublic information; and when the
breach of a family or other non-business relationship may give rise to liability
under the misappropriation theory of insider trading. The rules are designed to
promote the full and fair disclosure of information by issuers, and to clarify and
enhance existing prohibitions against insider trading.
Id. at 51,716.
For further elaboration of the relationship between the two provisions, see id. at 51,726,
which distinguishes Rule iob-5 and Regulation FD.
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Court's determination that the meaning of 'fraud' in Rule iob-5 is essentially
the same as the meaning of 'fraud' at common law."" Regulation FD cuts in
the opposite direction because it does not require proof that one person made
deliberate false statements to another that were relied on to the second party's
detriment.'oo
It is also worth noting the positive consequences for the scope of litigation
if Regulation FD were overturned, leaving the classical theory of insider
trading intact. The directors and officers of a firm could explicitly authorize the
selective release of firm information so that when designated insiders act in
accordance with that authorization, any claim for securities fraud against them
or their firm would basically be over. These types of lawsuits would disappear
and the resulting greater clarity of the law should help to improve information
flows in capital markets. Regulation FD therefore tends to push in the wrong
direction by increasing government oversight over securities markets in areas
where a light hand would better serve the public interest.
Not only is Regulation FD antithetical to Rule rob-5, it also gives an
unduly broad reading to the term "fair" in legal discourse. The basic ambiguity
in the use of the term is as follows. In the common-law context, in contrast to
Regulation FD, the notion of fairness was clearly tethered to traditional
theories of liability that involved the use of either force or fraud. Thus, the tort
of unfair competition was tied to the use of either force or disparagement in
order to prevent current or future customers from trading with the plaintiff.
The paradigmatic cases were as follows. The first involves one schoolmaster
shooting at the students of a rival school in order to drive them away from
their current teacher. There was no use of force against the rival schoolmaster,
but in Keeble v. Hickeringill,o'0 Judge Holt allowed the action for interference
(by force) of advantageous relationships, even in the absence of contract, and
that position was followed in Tarleton v. M'Gawley.'0 The same limitations
were also recognized in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 103 which
struck down, at least for the moment, the New Deal's competition codes, when
Chief Justice Hughes reverted to the common definition of unfair competition:
99. Aldave, supra note 59, at 104.
oo. For the elements of common law fraud, see, for example, Derry v. Peek (1889) 14 App. Cas.
337 (HL) 374-76 (Eng.). For the reprise in connection with the Exchange Act, see Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 189-91 (1976), which stresses the difference between fraud
and negligence. Cases of nondisclosure typically become actionable only when there is some
independent duty to disclose, which typically arises out of some fiduciary arrangement. See
Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 4o6 U.S. 128 (1972).
101. (1707) 103 Eng. Rep. 1127, 1128-29; 11 East, 573, 575-78 (QB).
102. (1793) 170 Eng. Rep. 153, 154; Peak 270, 272-74 (KB).
103. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
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"Unfair competition," as known to the common law, is a limited
concept. Primarily, and strictly, it relates to the palming off of one's
goods as those of a rival trader. In recent years, its scope has been
extended. It has been held to apply to misappropriation as well as
misrepresentation, to the selling of another's goods as one's own-to
misappropriation of what equitably belongs to a competitor. Unfairness
in competition has been predicated of acts which lie outside the
ordinary course of business and are tainted by fraud or coercion or
conduct otherwise prohibited by law. But it is evident that in its widest
range, "unfair competition," as it has been understood in the law, does
not reach the objectives of the codes which are authorized by the
National Industrial Recovery Act.'o4
Schechter, of course, did not last. The codes of fair competition that it
rejected under the National Industrial Recovery Act' quickly took hold in
other progressive, New Deal legislation. The new list included "unfair labor
practices" under the National Labor Relations Act,o 6 wage and hours
violations under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,107 and various forms of
discrimination that ran afoul of the Fair Housing Act of 1968. os The meaning
of the term "unfairness" in these progressive statutes is at complete
loggerheads with its common-law meaning. No one is concerned with the
prohibition on the private use of force and fraud in any of these cases. In each
of these cases, there is not a question of means, but rather a perceived end-state
that counts as fair or just, and it is the duty of the government to implement
that new goal through a comprehensive global policy that uses state coercion
and subsidies in endless permutations. No longer is there an effort to remove
obstacles to efficient voluntary markets. Rather, the goal is to displace those
voluntary markets to achieve some distributional outcome, which always
requires an enormous expansion of the notion of unlawful conduct.
The text of the Exchange Act does not read like these other statutes. It
reads like an antifraud statute, which is keen to cover not only obvious forms of
lying but also subtler practices that could achieve the same end.o9 Thus, it is a
104. Id. at 531-32 (citations omitted).
105. National Industrial Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 73-67, 48 Stat. 195 (1933), invalidated by
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
106. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158, 160 (2012).
1o7. Id. §§ 201-219.
1o8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2012).
log. See Aldave, supra note 59, at 104 ("[T]he meaning of 'fraud' in Rule iob-5 is essentially the
same as the meaning of 'fraud' at common law. As developed at common law, the elements
of a cause of action for fraud or deceit are the misrepresentation of a material fact, scienter,
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clear securities law violation to engage in "channel stuffing" - sales in one
period that are recorded as income and are subject to an unstated obligation to
repurchase the items sold in the next period."o The private transaction is an
artifice that is intended to mislead people as to the underlying activity of the
firm by ignoring the unstated liabilities that should be properly recorded on
the balance sheet. Nothing of that sort is involved in the selective disclosure of
information to some analysts but not others. The insiders owe fiduciary duties
of equal treatment only to their shareholders, not to their analysts. So long as
the directors and officers who make selective disclosures as a matter of practice
give notice to the rest of the world of that practice, any notion of concealment
is eliminated from the case.
At this point in the analysis, it becomes clear that Regulation FD, along
with other aggressive enforcement of the securities laws, marks a major
departure from the proper objectives of antifraud regulation. It is equally clear
that the newer system of securities regulation is a change for the worse. The
costs of regulation are heaviest on smaller firms, whose entry into the public
marketplace is retarded by the full range of securities regulation over every
aspect of the business. The regulation of market transactions is generally a
negative-sum proposition, even before the steep administrative costs of
enforcing Regulation FD are taken into account. It is imperative to condemn
this shift of emphasis from controlling fraud to mandating disclosure in the
broadest possible terms. Locally, Regulation FD illustrates the complications
that come from implementing the SEC's new imperatives. Globally, it
illustrates the train of abuses that follow from the aggressive implementation
of the progressive definitions of "fair" and "unfair" behavior. It is vital that we
forget neither.
This critique of Regulation FD helps explain the proper mix between
government regulation and private contract. There is no reason why the rules
of the game have to be set by the SEC for all corporations on the familiar, if
dangerous, one-size-fits-all model. It is quite sufficient that firms can issue,
with appropriate advance notice, a general disclosure that indicates their
reliance, causation, and damages. A mere failure to disclose material facts, as distinguished
from an affirmative misrepresentation or half-truth, is generally not actionable unless one
party owes a duty of disclosure to another 'because of a fiduciary or other similar relation of
trust and confidence between them."' (footnotes omitted) (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a) (Am. LAW. INST. 1977))).
io. See, e.g., Sunbeam Corp., Securities Act Release No. 7976, Exchange Act Release No. 44305,
2001 WL 616627, at *1 n.4 (May 1s, 2001) ("'Channel stuffing' denotes the pulling forward
of revenue from future fiscal periods by inducing customers -through price discounts,
extended payment terms or other concessions -to submit purchase orders in advance of
when they would otherwise do so.").
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pattern of business, as per the basic argument developed earlier."' Indeed, it is
quite clear that Justice Powell's simple explanation no longer represents current
policy, now that the SEC has prohibited the practice of "selective disclosure.""'
It is important, therefore, to stress that cases of asymmetrical information
need not involve some form of financial unfairness. The party who gets the
extra information has often put in greater effort to acquire it. And the parties
who lack information have the opportunity and motivation to acquire it as
quickly as possible. Indeed, in many cases the optimal strategy for the small
investor is to ally himself with some large public firm by buying shares in a
mutual fund that has the resources to thrive in dynamic markets with
asymmetrical information.
To be sure, there are powerful instincts today on behalf of protecting the
small investor who chooses to trade on his own account. The efficiency losses
of that protectionist strategy seem clear, so it is fair to ask exactly from where
the benefits come. In this sense, there is no instinct to protect poor or ignorant
people, because few individuals of either type are active as individual players in
the securities market. Rather, the more modest objective is for the SEC to
protect that small sliver of individuals who wish to manage their own
portfolios with complex trading strategies that often do not work well at all."
But the SEC is the wrong institution to attack this problem, for financial
education on such matters as index funds and portfolio diversification is better
provided for by private firms operating independent of the SEC.
Whatever the sentiment for this view, this rationale should be resisted for
the same reason that we should resist imitating the worst features of the
Robinson-Patman Act, whose major mission was to protect small businesses
that were losing market share to the more efficient chain stores. 4 These
distributional objectives are murky at best. In general, open entry can preserve
competitive pricing. Accordingly, it is a mistake to try to redesign the
Indianapolis speedway to accommodate go-karts, which is what the parity
principle tries to do. The better strategy is to let the go-karts be hopelessly
iii. See supra text accompanying notes 54-56.
112. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716 (Aug. 24, 2000) (codified
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243 & 249)
113. See, e.g., BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DowN WALL STREET: THE TIME-TESTED
STRATEGY FOR SUCCESSFUL INVESTING 17 (11th ed. 2011) ("Investors would be far better off
buying and holding an index fund than attempting to buy and sell individual securities or
actively managed mutual funds... . [B]uying and holding all the stocks in a broad stock-
market average was likely to outperform professionally managed funds whose high expense
charges and large trading costs detract substantially from investment returns.").
114. Robinson-Patman Act of 1936, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (2012). For a critique, see Thomas W. Ross,
Winners and Losers Under the Robinson-PatmanAct, 27 J. L. & EcoN. 243 (1984).
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outclassed, after which the savvy small investor places his money in a real
racecar. Unwisely, the SEC took the opposite tack, which was to slow down the
entire process by harping on the supposedly favorable distributional
consequences that come from sacrificing the efficiency gains obtainable from
the freer flow of information.
IV. BACK TO NEWMAN: OF PERSONAL BENEFITS AND
INFORMATION FLOWS
The previous analysis now makes it possible to revisit Newman and
examine how in principle it should deal with both the personal-benefit and
information-flow issues that form the core of the case.
A. Personal Benefit
In Newman, the personal-benefit rule operated as an essential cog of the
basic legal framework. That role is not entirely unwelcome in Dirks's second-
best universe in which the personal-benefit rule functions as an oblique check
on excessive SEC power by creating a zone of legality that should be routinely
allowed under the business judgment rule. Most analyst disclosures are not
made for cash or other equivalents, so they fall outside the scope of SEC
regulation. But doctrinal inaccuracy does exact an intellectual toll by forcing a
new inquiry into just how tangible or fixed a personal benefit has to be to meet
the requirements of this new rule.
In this context, cash or benefits in kind will count as personal benefits. So
too will quid pro quo introductions to potential clients or business partners, or
easing the path toward regulatory approval. But in Newman, the SEC insisted
that a diffuse set of social interactions was able to fill the hole created by the
personal-benefit rule."' These ostensible benefits include social friendship,
cooperation as members of the same church or club, career advice, and
examination preparation. If the personal-benefit rule means anything, the
Second Circuit concluded, these soft benefits cannot count because they are
virtually always present in a clubby industry that relies on high levels of
informal interaction." In support of that position is the proposition that forms
of mutual and reciprocal assistance are part of a social network among analysts
wholly apart from the application of securities law, so that the SEC's expansive
view of personal benefits is a far cry from the specific benefit made as part of a
quid pro quo. Judge Parker thus had a point when he said that if any of these
ns. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 4 3 8, 452 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 242 (2015).
n6. See id.
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facts established the requisite benefit, then "practically anything would
qualify."" 7
To which the answer is, perhaps, not so fast. In its forceful brief in the
petition for rehearing, the government took the view that these social
interactions were far out of the general social norm. In its view,
Ray [the insider at Dell] "desperately" wanted to be an analyst-a more
lucrative job than his job at Dell-and looked to Goyal [one of the
tippees] for career advice and help in securing such a position. To
maintain the stream of valuable inside information from Ray, Goyal
spoke with Ray more often and longer than he otherwise would have,
typically at night and on weekends."'
The clear implication is that this particular friendship went beyond simple
reciprocity and thus counted as an implied quid pro quo: you get us
information, and I will help you get a better job. But even here the inferences
are difficult to draw because in fact no job offer came out of the arrangements,
and of course, the defendants offered a very different interpretation of the
evidence:
The government never proved that Ray provided Goyal with material
nonpublic information about Dell in order to get career advice. The
prosecutors' decision not to call Ray as a witness spoke volumes: Ray
had proffered that he never connected Goyal's career advice to the Dell
information in his own mind, and Goyal's advice "did not influence the
manner in which [Ray] performed his duties at Dell." Goyal testified
that he gave Ray career advice for "one, one and a half years" before
Ray started providing any information about Dell. And Goyal
confirmed that Ray did not once link the Dell information to Goyal's
career advice in their conversations." 9
It is clear that appellate courts are not in a position to resolve these sorts of
detailed factual conflicts. But they are supposed to decide whether the
117. Id.
is. Petition of the United States of America for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc, supra note
92, at 5 (citation omitted). Similar sentiments are expressed in the government's petition for
certiorari, where it also excoriates the Second Circuit for its misreading of the personal-
benefits test. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4-14, United States v. Newman, 136 S. Ct.
242 (2015) (No. 15-137), 2015 WL 4572753, at *4-14.
iig. Brief of Defendant-Appellant Anthony Chiasson in Opposition to the United States of
America's Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc at lo, Newman, 773 F. 3d 438 (Nos.
13-1837-cr(L), 13-1917-cr(con)), 2015 WML io6441o, at*io (citations omitted).
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government has presented enough evidence to command a retrial of the issue
of personal benefit, which was not raised in the court below. That is a difficult
call. But if the case had been properly pleaded in the first place, it is again an
open question of what inferences should be drawn. In a civil case there might
be enough to go to a jury, but in a criminal case the matter surely is a lot closer.
Yet the larger question remains: who cares? Why sift through all the fine
nuances of this dispute on a question that in principle should have no relevance
to the outcome of the case? In principle, the Supreme Court should overrule
the personal-benefit prong of the insider trading offense. In practice, however,
it should take this step only if it substitutes in its place the more nuanced
account of fiduciary duty. In turn, that objective can be achieved only if the
Court rejects the SEC's selective disclosure prohibition by shielding authorized
disclosures to the analysts following the stock under the business judgment
rule, which has sadly fallen by the wayside in all these cases. It is to that issue
that I now turn.
B. The Information Transfer to the Defendants
The court in Newman noted that "the Supreme Court held that a tippee
may be found liable 'only when the insider has breached his fiduciary duty ...
and the tippee knows or should know that there has been a breach."'22 The
court did address the information transfer that disclosed "those companies'
earnings numbers before they were publicly released" that started with the
insiders and made its way to the two defendants, and from them to their
traders.12
In dealing with this last issue, it is important to look at the transaction
from the vantage point of both the transferor and transferee. Starting with the
transferor side, it bears restatement that under the rule stated in Dirks, the
authorized and selective release of this information should not count as a
breach of fiduciary duty to shareholders, given that it was consistent with
improving the overall position of the firm. At this point, the information
should be treated as part of the public domain, which means that its use can no
longer trigger any potential liability on the part of any downstream parties who
incorporate that information into their own decision making. That bright-line
rule clears the air and allows for the rapid dissemination of the relevant
information. Prosecutorial discretion is kept to a minimum.
izo. Newman, 773 F-3 d at 46 (alteration in original) (quoting Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 660
(1983))-
121. Id. at 443.
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Within this alternative conceptual framework, the next question is whether
the disclosure of that information was authorized, and on this point, the parties
in Newman again clashed. The government took the position that Dell and
NVIDIA each had formal policies that prohibited the disclosure of the
information in question.m' If that were all there were to the issue, then it would
be necessary to chase down the ebb and flow of the information once it left the
hands of the insiders to see how it influenced the behavior of Newman and
Chiasson. But there is more to the case than this simple scenario suggests,
because the defendants claimed that there were systematic deviations between
the official and day-to-day policies:
Dell and NVIDIA routinely leaked this information to analysts. The
evidence of leaks is significant because it shows that insiders provided
this type of information without any personal benefits -not even the
government argues that the leaks were motivated by self-dealing. More
importantly, it shows that Newman would have had no basis to believe
that the information he received was fraudulently disclosed."'
The hard question is why the gap between official and actual policy? The
answer seems to be that it would be suicidal for any corporation to adopt an
explicit policy that allowed for informal contacts with analysts, especially after
Regulation FD went on the books. Yet the constant interaction with the analyst
community is so important that it now takes place informally, in an intellectual
gray market. The uncertain legal status of these interchanges then renders the
whole matter ripe for controversy in litigation. But the baleful consequences of
forcing firms to adopt these shadowy disclosure practices extend beyond that.
Covert practices are clumsy practices, breeding unnecessary inequity and
confusion of their own. It is impossible to set out precise guidelines about how
and when the dissemination of information should take place, lest those
actions count as an open admission of illegal conduct. The consequence is that
the program is done less well than it ought to be if the entire matter were left to
the private choice of the company's officers and directors.
Thus, as a matter of first principle, the best strategy for the law is to avoid
both the personal-benefit issue and the knowledge and information question by
making it clear that corporations may, through their directors and officers,
allow firm employees to engage in the selective release of information to the
firm's general client list, and the problem goes away.
u2. See Brief for the United States of America at 9, 12, Newman, 773 F-3 d 438 (Nos. 13-1837(L),
13-1917(con)), 2013 WL 6163307, at *9, *12.
123. Reply Brief of Defendant-Appellant Todd Newman at to, Newman, 773 F.3 d 438 (Nos. 13-
1837-cr(L), 13-1917-cr(CON)), 2013 WL 6827040, at *io (citation omitted).
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The current legal doctrine blocks that approach. Unfortunately, the SEC's
prohibition on selective disclosure makes any organized release of information
improper. Therefore, under the current approach, it becomes critical to ask the
extent to which the information is material and nonpublic. It should be evident
that the dispute in Newman is miles removed from any hypothetical case where
one insider gives valuable information to some preferred donee, even out of the
goodness of his heart. In that setting, the information is surely nonpublic and
is likely to be material as well, given that no one else shares it. But the situation
is different here. The government's allegations, as summarized by the Second
Circuit, were that "a cohort of analysts at various hedge funds obtained
material, nonpublic information from employees of publicly traded technology
companies, shared it amongst each other, and subsequently passed this
information to the portfolio managers at their respective companies.""
This brief passage scarcely does justice to the tangled web of interactions
that took place among the various parties over the several years covered by the
investigation. A "cohort" implies a large number of parties who worked at
multiple firms, not just these two individuals. But just how many is unclear. In
this scenario, there is no hard-edged line between public and nonpublic
information. Indeed, it might be a stretch to say that this information is
"nonpublic" if a largish number of professionals were able to put it to quick
use, so that the market fully took it into account in setting the share price. The
situation was certainly leagues away from Texas Gulf Sulphur, where the group
of insiders who traded on inside information was tiny relative to the enormous
increase in value that came with one key fact - the discovery of major new finds
of copper.
There is also a question of whether this information counts as "material."
The value of information varies inversely with the number of people who share
it, and the rapidity with which that information is factored into overall market
valuations. Both of these points suggest that the information in question,
coming as it did in uncertain dribs and dabs, could not have been critical in
shaping overall price movements. That conclusion is only fortified because it is
equally clear that all of the analysts and traders had acquired large amounts of
information from other sources about the financial condition of Dell and
NVIDIA, and thus independent of anything contained in the information
supplied to these analysts. The abundance of other information further diluted
the significance of the information that had been transferred to this cohort of
analysts.
The point is important because it shows how difficult it is to make
judgments in isolation about what kinds of information are "material."
124. Newman, 773 F.3 d at 442.
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Everything depends on context. If information about the earnings reports was
the only information available, it might be able to move stock prices
substantially. But in this case its likely effect was small. Indeed, in addressing
this instance, the Second Circuit noted that it had far less than a one percent
influence on all the relevant numbers.s2 S
Needless to say, the case is even more complex than this because the
defendants point out, fairly it seems, that some of the information was
qualitative, and some of it was unreliable, if not downright erroneous, a fact
that was known (even if only imperfectly) by the parties who received it. So in
its petition for rehearing, the government offers this version of the facts:
"Newman and Chiasson made $4 million and $68 million in profits for their
respective funds by trading on secret earnings numbers that they encouraged
their analysts to collect from Dell, Inc. and NVIDIA Corporation over multiple
successive quarters."I2 6 The government's view of causation seems to assume a
push-pull connection between the receipt of information and gains from trade.
That connection in turn makes conviction inexorable, even if the underlying
reality suggests a complex network of information rivulets that combine,
divide, and combine again.
In litigation, the role of inside information takes on a different appearance
when looked at from the side of the transferee. Did the various defendants
know that the information in question was properly released, or did they think
that it had all come from a tainted source? The Second Circuit was emphatic in
its insistence that the swirling mass of information came from so many sources
that the defendants did not know or have any reason to suspect that it was
tainted at the point of its release.'2 7 It was very clear that the parties that
received this information did not segregate it out from information they
received from other sources, if only because it is not possible during the course
of quick conversations to verify the pedigree of each separate bit of information
that is included in the analysis. Indeed, each new layer of parties introduces an
added layer of complexity. So why go through this exhaustive trial?
The uneasiness with the government's condemnation of inside information
is that it does not seek to disaggregate any individual transfer of information
from the larger whole. It is quite possible that just one, or very few,
communications were prearranged from start to finish, while others were not,
125. See id. at 454.
126. Petition of the United States of America for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc, supra note
92, at 4.
127. See Newman, 773 F.3 d at 455 ("[N]o rational jury would find that the tips were so
overwhelmingly suspicious that Newman and Chiasson either knew or consciously avoided
knowing that the information came from corporate insiders or that those insiders received
any personal benefit in exchange for the disclosure.").
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and this one episode from many did generate substantial benefits. After all, the
parties in all the chains were familiar with each other and had worked together
on multiple occasions.
To get evidence on particular transactions requires a massive inquiry. But
why should the government invest so much in this problem if the aggregate
impact is likely to be modest relative to the kind of serious abuses that take
place in cases like O'Hagan? From any sensible point of view, the information
that was released should no longer be regarded as either nonpublic or material.
It was just one piece in a large mosaic. As with all information mosaics, there is
always a causation question of which bits of information obtained from what
sources influenced any decision to trade. It therefore does seem plausible that
the government could not carry its general burden of proof that the defendants
in this criminal trial had sufficient mens rea on the information in question.
So what should have been done procedurally, under the current
framework, if the knowledge issue had not been properly resolved in the
original trial? There are conflicting impulses, and the final judgment is not free
from doubt. On the one hand, if the record contains a jumble of facts, then the
questions of transfer of information (and personal benefit) generally resist
summary judgment. The government's effort to resist final disposition on
appeal is indeed fortified by the settled rule in the Second Circuit, which states:
"Although sufficiency review is de novo, we will uphold the judgments of
conviction if 'any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.""128 On that standard, it is hard to
explain why the jury could not in some instances draw an inference of
knowledge from the tightness with which the information was passed. It
should, one could argue, be the province of the jury to decide whether any
given communication and trade had the requisite effect, at which point a
remand, not the Second Circuit's dismissal with prejudice, again seems to be
the proper result.
But once again, the prospect of retrial would have carried unwelcome
complications. This is a criminal case, for which the proper approach might be
to call for a higher threshold before the particular issue gets to the jury, at
which point the mass of evidence cutting against the government's position
could matter in the outcome of the case. The analogous issue has come up
before. In Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,"' the plaintiff, a public figure, sued
the defendant for defamation, under the applicable rule from New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan,3o which required that the plaintiff establish malice by clear and
128. Id. at 451 (quoting United States v. Chavez, 549 F.3 d 11g, 124 (2d Cir. 2008)).
129. 477 U.S. 242, 254-55 (1986).
130. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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convincing evidence.131 The Court held in Anderson that when considering
whether to grant summary judgment, "a trial judge must bear in mind the
actual quantum and quality of proof necessary to support liability under New
York Times."' 2 The standard of proof in a criminal case is still higher, and that
should be reflected in the overall calculus as well, which again counsels in favor
of a higher standard of review for criminal convictions. The case is quite
different from a civil action demanding forfeiture of illicit gains, without jail
time or penalty. So again, within the existing framework of the law, the case is,
sadly, a toss-up.
The saga of Newman has now come to an end, as the U.S. Supreme Court
denied the government's petition for certiorari on October 5, 2015,'3 as well it
should have. In its brief, the United States spent most of its firepower
attacking the relaxation of the personal-benefit standard in Newman, and
relatively little dealing with the information point. Two sentences from the
government's briefing show the equivocation. First, the petition for certiorari
asserted, "The Second Circuit also stated that 'the Government presented
absolutely no testimony or any other evidence' that respondents knew, or
consciously avoided knowing, that they were trading on information in
exchange for which the insiders 'received any benefit.'"" But whether
respondents knew that the insiders obtained a personal benefit is likewise
bound up with the legal question of what constitutes a personal benefit in the
first place. Second, in its reply brief, the government acknowledged in a
backhanded fashion that the grant of certiorari on the knowledge question
would not change the outcome of the case.' 3 ' Finally, in his remarks at New
York University Law School, Mr. Bharara spoke only of the personal-benefit
prong of the case and ignored the issue of knowledge.* There is a real cost in
taking this limited view, for it gives Newman greater significance than it
deserves. Just recently, Mr. Bharara announced that he was dropping several
131. Id. at 285-86.
132. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254.
133. United States v. Newman, 136 S. Ct. 242 (2015) (denying certiorari).
134. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 118, at 29 (citations omitted).
135. Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 6-7, Newman, 136 S. Ct. 242 (No. 15-137), 2015 WL 5254347,
at *6-7 ("Respondents contend that this Court's resolution of the question presented could
not 'change the result of this case.' But they do not contest that the sufficiency of the
evidence on personal benefit depends entirely on the meaning of that concept." (citations
omitted)). I treat this as an evasive admission that the government, at least for the purposes
of the petition for certiorari, could not satisfy the information prong of the case.
136. See N.Y.U. Sch. of Law, The Forum: A Conversation with US Attorney Preet Bharara,
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other prosecutions.3 1 In my view, he has a good chance of getting the
personal-benefit prong of Newman reversed in a case that presents clean
evidence that the recipients knew they had received inside information. His
correct strategy therefore should be to minimize the importance of Newman by
noting that most other prosecutions do not present fatal weaknesses on that
issue. This point gains strength by looking at the response to Newman and the
issues the personal-benefit prong raises in other cases.
V. NEWMAN AND THE MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY IN OTHER
CASES
The conceptual difficulties that complicated the analysis in Newman are
also evident in other cases that deal with this issue, to which some brief
attention should be given." 8 In this regard, I start with two cases that should
be easy wins for the government, and then turn to a third case that presents
more difficult challenges.
The first case is United States v. McGee,' 9 which turned exclusively on the
personal-benefit prong of the insider-trading test. Sometime between 1999
and 2001, Timothy McGee befriended Christopher Maguire, who was an
insider at the Philadelphia Consolidated Holding Corporation (PHLY), at
sessions of Alcoholics Anonymous, and became Maguire's informal mentor.
Years later, the two met again when Maguire mentioned to McGee that a
looming sale of PHLY had led to his relapse. "McGee borrowed approximately
$226,ooo at 6.875% interest to partially finance the purchase of 10,750 PHLY
shares. Shortly after the public announcement of PHLY's sale, McGee sold his
shares, resulting in a $292,128 profit." 4 o Thereafter, he sought to escape
conviction by insisting that he did not have a tight enough relationship with
Maguire to satisfy the personal-benefit prong of the test."' The Third Circuit
gave the right answer to, as it were, the wrong question when it stated that
137. See Christopher M. Matthews & Aruna Viswanatha, U.S. Attorney Aims To Dismiss
Insider Trading Charges in SAC Capital Advisors Case, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 22, 2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-attorney-moves-to-dismiss-insider-trading-charges-in-sac
-capital-advisors-case-144554S210 [http://perma.cc/98D 4-ZMMY].
138. For an analysis of the residual uncertainty these cases pose under the misappropriation
theory, see Steven R. Glaser & Daniel B. Weinstein, Law on Insider Trading Misappropriation
Theory Remains Unsettled, N.Y.L.J. (Nov. 3, 2014), http://www.skadden.com/sites/default
/files/publications/O 7 Oll4oSkadden.pdf [http://perma.cc/4G4W-2FUA].
139. 763 F.3d 304 (3 d Cir. 2014).
140. Id. at 308.
141. Id. at 316 (challenging the sufficiency of evidence supporting a securities fraud conviction in
which the jury found a "relationship of trust or confidence").
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their past relationships were sufficiently close."' The case is a perfect example
of why the personal-benefit test is irrelevant. The only point that matters is
whether the firm authorized the release of the information for its own benefit,
which it manifestly did not. Since McGee knew the exact state of affairs, his
trades were patently illegal and the criminal conviction was justified wholly
without regard to the details of his past relationships.
The second of the easy post-Newman cases is United States v. Salman, 3
which unfolded as follows. Maher Kara, a new member of Citibank's health
care group, leaked information concerning the activities of companies that
worked in cancer and pain management to his brother, Mounir "Michael"
Kara. Michael in turn shared that information with his future brother-in-law,
Bassam Salman, who traded on the information and shared the profits with
Michael.1" The case is an easy one for conviction. The release of the
information was unauthorized, was known to be unauthorized,"s and supplied
no benefit whatsoever to Citibank. The situation is far removed from the
general release of information to analysts in the ordinary course of business in
Newman. The defense that Salman offered was that his connection to Maher
and Michael was not close enough to satisfy the personal-benefit prong in
Newman. 6 Jed Rakoff, a Senior District Judge within the Second Circuit,
sitting by designation, took the occasion to say that if Newman required more
beyond "a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or a friend," 47
"we decline to follow it."4 8
And so he should, especially since the entire personal-benefit prong of
Dirks is a mistake in the first place. The key line of distinction between the two
cases is that Salman was in cahoots with Maher and Michael in the collection
and unauthorized use of stolen information, which makes the case an easy
criminal conviction. The personal-benefit prong is a distraction when the
illegal collection and sharing of information is undisputed.
The analysis is a good deal more difficult in SEC v. Cuban."' Mark Cuban,
the colorful owner of the Dallas Mavericks, had received an invitation from the
CEO of Mamma.com to participate in a new round of funding for the company
142. Id. at 317.
143. 792 F. 3d 1087 (9 th Cir. 2015).
144. Id. at 1089.
145- Id.
146. Id. at lo91.
147. Id. at 1092 (quoting Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 664 (1983)).
148. Id. at 1093.
149. 62o F.3 d 551 (5th Cir. 2010).
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in which Cuban was already a substantial minority shareholder.so Cuban
strongly opposed that financial plan, and promptly sold all his shares on
receiving that information, thereby avoiding some $750,000 in losses when the
stock tanked after the refinancing plan became public."' The factual dispute in
question was over the conditions that the CEO attached to the sharing of the
information with Cuban. The government's position was that Cuban agreed
not to disclose the plan to anyone else and not to sell his shares.5' The Fifth
Circuit held that the misappropriation theory applied if he had agreed not to
sell his shares.5 On that factual dispute, Cuban prevailed when the case was
retried. 54
The entire matter is ticklish. It makes perfectly good sense for Cuban to
agree to be silent about the potential offering when he receives the information.
But it is quite another to ask him to retain the shares after he formed the
independent judgment that the proposed financing plan would be a disaster. It
therefore is highly unlikely that anyone in his position would agree not to trade
on that information. But by the same token, Cuban would have suffered
serious losses if he had never received the information before the plan went
public. On this view, it may be possible that Cuban would have desired the
information so much that he would have made that fatal concession. But if he
did, then he would have been worse off than if he had not heard anything from
the CEO because he could have sold the stocks in ignorance of the entire
transaction.
The case shows just how difficult it is to deal with these matters on an ad
hoc basis. The correct response is not to find out what is expected in these
cases through a criminal trial. Instead, it is for all companies to articulate a
policy in which they decide in advance how insiders should be able to respond
to this information, which is very hard to do, to say the least. The difficulty
here is in a sense unavoidable. The second prong of Rule lob5 -2(b) points to
reasonable expectations as the touchstone of potential liability in those cases
iso. Id. at 552.
isi. Id. at 556.
152. Id. at 552.
153. Id. at 554-55.
154. See, e.g., Andrew Harris & Tom Korosec, SEC Loses as Mark Cuban Triumphs in Insider-
Trading Trial, BLOOMBERG Bus. (Oct. 17, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.con/news
/articles/2o3-lo-16/billionaire-mark-cuban-found-not-liable-in-sec-lawsuit [http://perma
.cc/QH8W-CVNU] ("In reaching their decision, jurors were required to answer seven
questions, among them whether Cuban had received material, non-public information
about the [stock offering], whether he had agreed to keep that information confidential and
not act on it, and whether he acted on it without telling the company he planned to do so.
Their answer to those questions was no.").
1529
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
where there is no explicit agreement to use the information only for limited
purposes. As is always the case, the test works perfectly well in easy cases like
McGee, but fiffully at best in cases like Cuban. In the end, it probably matters
that Cuban is a criminal prosecution and not a civil case. In line with general
principles, the benefit of the doubt should go to the criminal defendant and not
to the State.
CONCLUSION
This Feature sought to reexamine the legal principles governing insider
trading in light of the recent Second Circuit decision in United States v.
Newman. The emergent picture is complex. The difficulties start with the
inability to identify any persuasive rationale for the insider trading prohibition
in the first place. With respect to classical insider trading, a corporation should
be able to define its own policy on how insiders trade and use that to guide
how investors should respond in the marketplace. With respect to
misappropriation cases, the wrongs in question are directed toward the
corporation that supplied the information and not the public at large. Thus the
risks of misappropriation are best met by explicit contractual principles that
limit the use of the information by the recipient and his ability to share it with
other individuals. In general, contractual restrictions should be sufficient to
deal with these instances, which leaves only a small place for the securities law
to impose additional sanctions in an area that is best left to private ordering.
The current situation, of course, allows for criminal prosecutions for
trading on inside information, and the above analysis offers guidelines as to
how that should be done -if it is to be done at all. The central takeaway is that
the sole violation that matters is the deliberate use or sharing of information
contrary to the wish of the firm that has supplied it in the first place. These
unauthorized uses should impose liability on the immediate recipient and any
person who takes with knowledge of the illegal release. That prohibition
should apply under a constructive trust theory, whether or not the recipient is
deemed to have in fact some relationship of trust and confidence with the
corporation, and it should apply wholly without regard to whether the party
who leaked the information received some return benefit, tangible or
intangible. Following these simple principles should vastly improve the overall
operation of the securities law, which is now in a sad state of intellectual and
administrative disarray.
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